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1
Introduction
The Sonoran desert spans nearly 100,000 square miles; a magnificent wilderness ornamented by
saguaros and ragged mountain ranges. The diverse landscape, an amalgamation of various
terrain, is the definitive backdrop of the western portion of the U.S.-Mexico border. These
borderlands are also home to remains: discovered or undiscovered, the bones scattered around
the Southwestern U.S. border are a gripping testimony to the cruel weaponization of the desert.
In early 2018, humanitarian aid organization No More Deaths released a report detailing the
border patrol’s purposeful destruction of supplies left out in the desert for migrants. Hours later,
a volunteer with the organization named Scott Warren was arrested and charged with a felony for
harboring migrants. Allegedly, border patrol had witnessed him providing food and water to two
migrants in the Cabeza Prieta wilderness and for this, Warren faced up to five years in prison.1
In August of 2019, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services eliminated a
deferred action program without precedent or public notice. The intention of this program was to
withhold deportation for those who, or whose relatives, were undergoing lifesaving medical
treatment. Recipients of this program received a letter, explaining that if they did not leave the
country within 33 days, they would be subject to deportation. Many of the patients who received
these letters suffered from debilitating diseases such as cancer, cystic fibrosis, HIV, and epilepsy.
Family members and doctors alike described the elimination of this program as a “death
sentence,” unable to continue the necessary treatment if deported.2

Scott Warren, “I gave water to migrants crossing the Arizona desert. They charged me with a felony,” The
Washington Post, 2 8 May 2019.
2
Mimi Jordan and Caitlin Dickerson, “Sick Migrants Undergoing Lifesaving Care Can Now Be Deported,” The
New York Times, 2 9 August 2019.
1
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In April of 2020, amid the covid-19 pandemic, 44 migrants aboard the same deportation
flight from the U.S. to Guatemala tested positive for the disease. Deportees from the U.S. are
reported to make up 20% of the 500 cases in Guatemala at the time I am writing this.3 As U.S.
deportations continue and the disease spreads, it is likely that the populations of infected
individuals around the world will increase by the day. The deportation of individuals to other
countries now not only signifies the repatriation of particular individuals, but the exportation of a
deadly virus.
The cases I have presented here are only a magnification of global migration dynamics,
limited to one single country and spanning only three short years. In reality, the conditions that
have allowed for each case traverse both nations and decades. When presented in a vacuum, the
three instances I have listed might appear unnecessarily cruel: under what circumstances is it
wrong to provide water to a person dying of thirst? What threat does a child suffering from
cancer pose to national security? Is the deportation of 100 people really worth the exacerbation
of a pandemic?
Viewing each case as not an isolated incident, but in part with a greater legacy of
nationhood and migration contextualizes the events at work. However, the same questions
remain unanswered. Migration has been thematic in my life, owing to the recent history of
migration on both sides of my family as well as its pervasiveness within political discourse in the
last few decades. Throughout years of exposure to discourse of migration, I have heard a number
of justifications for the deportation of migrants and the securitization of our borders; the tamest
of which resort to abstract national security principles, while the most emphatic homogenize

3

Natalie Gallón, “44 Migrants on one U.S. deportation flight tested positive for coronavirus,” CNN. 1 7 April 2020.
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migrants into a faceless mass, characterized by criminality and societal denigration. And yet, the
questions I have posed regarding the three cases presented persist. Exactly what threat do the
migrant dying of thirst and the sick child pose to the great nation of America? Or, rather, how
does the United States benefit from a migrant’s dehydration, lack of medical care, or deportation
amidst a dangerous pandemic? As I attempt to answer each inquiry, I find them merging into
one, overarching question: why is the migrant so destabilizing?
To this question, I respond simply that the migrant is such a destabilizing figure because
the nation state requires them to be. In what follows, I will argue that the migrant, as a
transnational figure, threatens to undermine the logic of nationhood and is thus subject to a
process of rendering in which they are exposed to the forces of sovereign violence. In doing so,
the nation-state transforms migrants into politically serviceable bodies that it may use to
reproduce its own sovereignty - the final step in a bloody cycle of self-legitimation upon which
our nationalized system depends.
In the first chapter, I will establish a paradox of national sovereignty, beginning with an
examination of the logic of the nation-state. I hope to first observe the condition of inclusion and
exclusion, upon which the nation-state is perceived to operate: in essence, the understanding that
those who reside within a particular nation’s borders are included within that nation-state and,
therefore, those who reside without are excluded. Effectively, the condition of inclusion within
one nation-state renders the condition of exclusion within all others. I will then destabilize the
dichotomy of inclusion and inclusion, emphasizing how the transnational nature of migration and
statelessness resists such a binary and, in doing so, complicates widely-held perceptions of
citizenship, localization, and boundaries. The migrant inherently threatens the conventional logic
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on which the nation-state depends, threatening to expose the constructed foundation of
nationalization and, therefore, threatening the very sovereignty of the nation-state. I argue then
that the state manages to evade such exposure not through the elimination of the migrant, but
through the dissemination of discourse that portrays migrants as threats towards national security
and prosperity. Through this process, the nation-state is able engage in the performative
production of its own sovereignty, highlighting the paradox of national sovereignty: as the
transnational nature of migration and statelessness threatens logic of the nation-state, the
nation-state simultaneously relies upon such a threat in order to legitimize its sovereignty in the
eyes of its citizens. Plainly, the transnationality of the migrant is a fact upon which the
nation-state is conditional - without it, the production of national sovereignty would be
impossible and the nation-state would ultimately shatter.
The second chapter will serve as an exploration into national borders in three parts. The
first section will consist of a discussion of the conventional wisdom surrounding national
borders, in which borders are perceived as territorially-bound barriers with specific geographical
locations and limitations. I will challenge this conception, arguing that the border is not a
territorial entity but an aphysical one. Rather than providing a geographical boundary between
insiders and outsiders, I assert that the national border provides a condition of existence upon
those who find themselves at the intersection of sovereignty and statelessness. The condition of
the national border, then, is not affixed to the seam of two nation-states, but permeates the
entirety of the nation-state, placing migrants in a semi-permanent state of exception. The second
section of this chapter will provide an analysis of Agamben’s notion of sacred life as it pertains
to national borders, observing how the border functions not as a barrier but as a rendering
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process that strips migrants of their political life, exposing them to the forces of sovereign
violence. I will examine how such a process subverts conventional conceptions of belonging,
revealing how the perceived binary of citizenship serves instead as a spectrum. The spectrum of
citizenship, I argue, can be divided into three ambiguous and flexible classifications of
anti-citizen, quasi-citizen, and citizen, with each being defined not by their relation to inclusion,
but their relation to death. In the third and final section, I will discuss how the border-rendering
process contributes to the purposeful erasure and exploitation of the migrant. Cheifly, I argue
that the nation-state engages in a process of sovereign reproduction, weaponizing national
borders as means of reducing the migrant to bare life and thereby exposing them to sovereign
violence. In imposing violence upon the migrant, the nation-state is able to subordinate the
migrant through means of labor exploitation, detention, and physical harm.
The final chapter will be dedicated to an empirical demonstration of my findings, in
which I will examine the operation of the Southwestern United States border with Mexico in
order to contextualize my findings. Following a brief analysis of U.S. involvement in Latin
American affairs, I will discuss the discourses of danger that surround the presence of Mexican
and Central American migrants in the United States. In order to display the imposition of
sovereign violence upon these migrants, I will turn to three groups of policy: illegalization,
deterrence, and zero-tolerance. Finally, I aim to demonstrate how, through the exploitation and
erasure of the migrant within the United States, the nation-state fulfills a cycle of
self-reproduction and, in doing so, fortifies its sovereignty. Ultimately, I intend to illustrate how
national sovereignty requires the subordination and violation of migrants, laying the bloody
groundwork upon which every nation-state is constructed.

6
Chapter 1: The Nation
The Paradox of the National Logic

The exploitation and subjugation of the border-crossing migrant is not an unfortunate risk of
nationalization, but a metric of its success. Understanding both sovereign violence and the ways
in which migrants are subjected to it requires first an understanding of the nation-state itself. The
logic of the nation-state is widely conceived to be conditional on a basis of inclusion and
exclusion: those who reside within a particular nation-state are included and those who reside
without are excluded; similarly, those who are included within one nation-state are excluded by
all others. In my analysis of the nation-state, I propose a destabilization of this dichotomy, taking
into consideration how contradictory factors like citizenship and localization confound the
inclusion/exclusion binary and furthermore, how the inclusive exclusion of the migrant exposes
the construction upon which the nation-state finds its legitimacy. I then observe how the
nation-state is able to evade such exposure through the promulgation of discourse and policy that
mischaracterizes the migrant as a threat to U.S. security and prosperity, while simultaneously
gaining legitimacy through the response to that alleged threat. Ultimately, what I establish is the
paradox of national sovereignty: while the transnational nature of cross-border migration poses a
threat to national legitimacy and identity, the migrant themself is a condition of the existence of
the nation-state - without which, the nation-state would be unable to legitimize its sovereignty in
the eyes of its citizens and would subsequently disintegrate.
Here, I aim to discuss the foundation of the nation-state as it is an imagined entity, insofar
as it defines a distinct community within a set of other distinct communities with no natural or
tangible geographical definition. Nation-states are both limited as well as imagined to have finite
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boundaries beyond which lie other distinct membership communities - other nation-states.4 Both
the imagined and the limited quality of the nation-state is imperative to understanding the logic
of a nationalized system, and moreover, to understanding the need for nation-states to maintain a
legitimate, sovereign identity in the eyes of its citizens. I will use these concepts in order to
demonstrate how such a system attempts to erase any possibility for ambiguity in an individual’s
relation to distinct sovereign nations, and how the migrant is ultimately the physical
representation of ambiguity within an international system. Though this ambiguity threatens to
expose the fact of a nation’s sovereignty as legitimate only in that it is imagined - revealing the
fragility of sovereignty - the nation-state is able to mechanize the migrant’s indeterminate
national belonging to aid in the ceaseless quest for national legitimacy. In this process, the
migrant is falsely characterized as a threat to the security and prosperity of the nation and
subsequently made subject to violent subordination. Forcibly made to take part in the quest for
sovereign legitimacy, the migrant is rewarded with exploitation, violence, and erasure, as the
sovereign nation enjoys a renewed sense of security in its legitimacy.

Inclusive Exclusion
In order to truly grasp the logic of the nation-state, it is vital to take into account what the
nation-state is not. Emma Haddad notes the duality of sovereign governments: “ International
society divides the world into sovereign states. Sovereignty means authority – external autonomy
and internal control. A sovereign government is therefore Janus-faced: it simultaneously faces
outwards at other states and inwards at its population.”5 Haddad’s conception of a “Janus-faced”

4
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Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 54.
Ibid., 48.
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sovereign government highlights what is perhaps the most critical component to the identity
formation of a nation-state: an external body for which the nation-state’s identity may be formed
not with, but against. What defines those who are included is those who are excluded; the citizen
is not only inherently connected to, but contingent on, the outsider.6 Without the imagined
outsider, the citizen would be indistinguishable, for the existence of an included body
necessitates a body that is excluded. The existence of a marked outsider - a foreigner, an alien, an
other - is necessary for citizenship to have any meaning, and thus, necessary for the nation-state
to be able to identify as such (as sovereignty depends on a citizenry over which to be sovereign).

Insider/Outsider Convention
David Campbell discusses the basis upon which identity is constituted, writing, “Whether
we are talking of ‘the body’ or ‘the state,’ or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each
is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the
inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an
‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.”7 Plainly, the nation-state requires non-citizens - who can
viably be citizens of a different nation-state - to distinguish its own citizens, and thus legitimize
its own sovereignty. Therefore, a viable assumption would be that the nation-state actually
requires the outsider - the excluded body. However, when that which is external aims to move
inward, it threatens the very logic of the nation-state. It is for this reason I aim to shift my focus
from simply the figure of the outsider to that of the migrant, specifically the migrant whose

6
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Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 54.
David Campbell, Writing Security (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) 9.
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intent or attempt to cross a national border both complicates and illuminates the fundamental
operation of the nation-state.
The simultaneous inclusion of citizens and externality of the foreign has allowed a fragile
dichotomy to take place, one whose inverse logic suggests an inherent mutual exclusion. For
example, a single person exists in a constant state of inclusion and e xclusion, but only in that
they are included in one state, and therefore, excluded from all others. However, the mutual
exclusion applies in regards to a person’s relation to a single nation state: if a person is included
in one particular nation-state, it would seem impossible that they are simultaneously excluded
from that same nation-state. As “inclusion” and “exclusion” are oxymoronic in nature, a person
seemingly may not take on both the role of an insider and an outsider in relation to a single
nation-state. However, the transnationality of migration renders the fragile binary of inclusion
and exclusion entirely obscured.

Transnationality and Statelessness
The migrant who aims to cross a national border certainly qualifies as an outsider figure
on the basis of their intent to permeate a boundary which is largely understood to demarcate
insider from outsider. Here is the migrant’s relation to border-crossing: it is their intent, attempt,
or success in crossing a national border. Once the migrant enters into this relation, they at once
compromise the logic of the nation-state. In a nationalized world composed of mutually
exclusive states, it seems reasonable to determine that every person is included within a
particular sovereign body, and excluded by all other sovereign bodies that lie beyond its borders.
Inclusion itself instinctively signifies a form of belonging or membership to that sovereign body,
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which largely manifests as citizenship within the current international order. Yet, the migrant’s
relation to border-crossing unravels this conventional wisdom, in that the migrant cannot
possibly leave one country without eventually entering into another one.8 Primarily, what this
truth reveals is the necessary distinction between localization and legal membership. While
national borders are generally conceived to define the insider (citizen) from the outsider
(foreigner), it is not necessarily valid that all those who are located within a set of borders are
citizens of that nation-state and those who lie beyond are not (many citizens travel, work, and
reside within countries of which they are not citizens). Therefore, location alone does not
determine a person’s insider/outsider status in relation to a particular nation-state. That being
said, I do not wish to argue that a migrant who becomes located in a nation-state of which they
are not a citizen entirely destabilizes the dichotomous principle of inclusion/exclusion that
founds the nation-state - they may be geographically included within the borders of nation they
immigrate to, but remain more largely excluded if they are not citizens of that country. That
migrant must simply have their relationship to a specific sovereign body redefined - through a
process such as repatriation or naturalization - in order to become reterritorialized and thereby
reaffirm the imagined nation-state (and in doing so, becoming technically “included.”)9 In short,
the migrant’s reterritorialization legitimizes the nation-state’s hegemony; in redefining a
migrant’s belonging to a particular nation, the nation-state not only emphasizes its own control
over matters of belonging but simultaneously fortifies the belief that every person must, in some
way, belong to a nation-state.

8
9

Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 26.
Ibid., 60.
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What complicates the inclusion/exclusion principle is the process of redefining a
migrant’s relation to a sovereign body - and thereby reaffirming the inclusion/exclusion binary when addressing stateless peoples. An extensive number of migrants, and those on whom I am
largely focused, aim to cross national borders owing to the fact that their own nation-citizen
relation has been severed. If the nation-state is charged with the protection of its citizens, a lack
of sovereign protection from factors that undermine quality of life or threaten it entirely - or
perpetuation by the sovereign government of these factors - may force a person to leave their
nation-state, rendering one who was once a citizen stateless. The stateless migrant is perhaps
more destabilizing than any other, serving as an embodiment of what the nation-state wishes to
conceal: in their absence of belonging to any particular nation-state, the stateless migrant
occupies a liminal space that does not conform to a nationalized system in that they are not truly
included in any one nation-state. There lies an innate tension in the occupation of such a space,
as the nationalized order in place determines that it is nearly impossible to be geographically
located in such a way that one is not “included” - physically - within some set of national
borders, and yet the stateless person remains in a state of exclusion, regardless of their physical
location. Therefore, the stateless person exposes more potently than any other that inclusion and
exclusion are not physical truths, territorially-bound through borders, but political constructions.
The condition of statelessness is nearly intolerable to the nation-state, an entity that depends on
the concealment of its own construction in order to remain sovereign - for it is an imagined
community, perceived by its citizens to be a bounded, organic space of inclusion with finite
borders. The sovereignty of the nation-state depends on this perception, yet it is this perception
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that inherently contradicts the “imagined,” constructed quality of the nation-state. Were its
constructedness to be revealed, the imagined community would ultimately be at risk of fracture.
Despite the inherent threat the stateless person provides, the condition of statelessness is a
symptom of nationalization, only possible through the narrative of territoriality and sovereignty
that the nation-state provides. Nation-states in which citizens are facing persecution,
displacement, or lack of representation are likely to yield significant numbers of migrants who
flee to neighboring countries. A widespread misconception regarding stateless migrants is that
they innately qualify as refugees, owing to the lack of protection provided by their originary
nation-state and the danger they face as a result. Despite the qualifications for refugee status set
by the 1951 Refugee Convention10, history would see that, when confronted by mass migration
(owing to human rights violations), the nations to which those migrants are most likely to flee
respond with policy that limits the ability of those migrants to obtain asylum, citizenship, or
residency. Examples of such policies include restrictions placed on migration to the U.S. from
Nazi-occupied territory prior to and during World War II;11 the inaction following the
implementation of EU quotas for accepting non-EU asylum seekers after 2015 following
displacement in North Africa and the Middle East;12 the Trump administration’s frequent
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The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who: “owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than
one nationality, the term ‘the country of his nationality’ shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national,
and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid
reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is
a national.”
11
Richard Breitman, “The Troubling History of How America’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule Blocked Jews Fleeing Nazi
Germany,” TIME, 29 October 2019.
12
Despite quotas set for the relocation of non-EU asylum seekers from Greece and Italy in 2015, Amnesty
International reports that most countries failed to fulfill them within the two-year period designated: Poland and
Hungary refused to accept any refugees; Slovakia accepted 16 of the 902 asylum-seekers it was assigned; the Czech
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attempts to restrict migration from those fleeing gang violence in the Northern Triangle.13 On the
subject of refugeedom, Haddad observes,
A wide definition of who falls into the category ‘refugee’ may increase the potential
burden on the host state, while accepting a greater failure on the part of the state of
origin. A narrow definition, on the other hand, runs the risk of denying protection and
assistance to individuals in need and thus not fulfilling basic moral and humanitarian
obligations. The granting of refugee status has therefore come to mean that asylum is
more an ‘entitlement’ than ‘a discretionary bestowal of political grace’... hence asylum
and refugee status is now ‘a scarce resource’ the scarcity of which, however, is political
and not physical.14
The “political scarcity” noted by Haddad lends itself to strategies that restrict qualifications for
refugee status from countries that are producing high numbers of asylum-seekers. In the wake of
policies that limit eligibility for asylum, the stateless migrant is left unrepresented by any
sovereign nation - despite the fact that, due to the nationalized system in place, it is impossible
for that migrant to be geographically excluded from all nations; they must at all times be within
one nation’s borders, and thus, arguably qualify as geographically “included” within that nation
owing only to their localization.
A migrant’s ability to be “included” in the nation to which they migrate is further
complicated by the legality of seeking asylum, including laws that impact migration before and
after asylum is officially sought. While the right of any person to seek asylum is theoretically

Republic accepted 12 of 2,691; Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal accepted less than 50%; Finland and
Ireland accepted over 75% but did not satisfy their quotas; Malta was the only country to fulfill its quota; Norway
and Lichtenstein voluntarily opted in to the process and fulfilled their commitments.
13
In June of 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered that claims of gang violence and domestic violence
are not grounds for protection in the United States, following the dramatic increase of gang violence in the Northern
Triangle, producing thousands of asylum-seekers who reach the Southwestern U.S. border.
14
Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 26.
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upheld by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights15 and the 1951 Refugee Convention,
a specter of illegality is omnipresent as stateless people seek asylum is present even before they
cross a national border. Furthermore, the illegality that accompanies statelss migration applies to
more than just the asylum-seeker themself. Particular cases have gained worldwide recognition
cocnerning individuals who attempt to provide humanitarian aid (such as water and food) for
asylum seekers have been prosecuted and brought up on various charges, including trespassing
and abandonment of personal property.16 Similarly, others who attempt to physically accompany
a migrant in their quest to reach a national border have been convicted or fought charges such as
aiding-and-abetting. Certain countries have managed to sidestep the legality of asylum-seeking
with laws that successfully curtail rescue missions intended for migrants crossing dangerous
terrain (such as ocean or desert), including laws that criminalize the docking of rescue ships in
particular ports and national shores.17
If a migrant does successfully reach the borders of a nation in which they can safely seek
asylum, many are still denied refugee status. Nicholas De Genova discusses the qualifications for
refugee status:

Indeed, the criteria for granting asylum tend to be so stringent, so completely predicated
upon suspicion, that it is perfectly reasonable to contend that what asylum regimes really
produce is a mass of purportedly 'bogus' asylum seekers. Hence, in systematic and
predictable ways, asylum regimes disproportionately disqualify asylum seekers, and
convert them into 'illegal' and deportable 'migrants'. All such officially 'unwanted' or
15

Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution.This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”
16
Scott Warren, “I gave water to migrants crossing the Arizona desert. They charged me with a felony,” The
Washington Post, 2 8 May 2019.
17
German sea-captain Pia Klemp rescued over 1,000 migrants in the Mediterranean sea before her boat was seized
by Italian authorities. As of 2020, she faces 20 years in prison for aiding-and-abetting. Another German sea-captain,
Carola Rackete, was arrested in 2019 for illegally docking at an Italian port with 40 migrants on board. (Dixon and
Wojazer)
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'undesirable' non-citizens are stigmatized with allegations of opportunism, duplicity and
undeservingness. The compulsive denunciation, humiliation and exquisitely refined
rightlessness of deportable 'foreigners', furthermore, supply the rationale for
essentializing the juridical inequalities of citizenship and alienage as categorical
differences that may be racialized.18
De Genova emphasizes another critical truth of this process: the systemic manner in
which those who have crossed a border and have been denied asylum are once again targets of
illegality, now becoming stigmatized and disqualified from citizenship entirely. Therefore, a
migrant who has crossed a national border and has become geographically included remains
truly excluded, having not been reterritorialized according to the standards of the nation-state by
obtaining citizenship or a sanctioned alternative, such as residency or refugee status.

State of Inclusive Exclusion
The migrant then enters into a paradoxical state of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion,
summarily entering into a state of what Giorgio Agamben terms “inclusive exclusion.”
Agamben’s work Homo Sacer d etails inclusive exclusion as it provides a distinction between
“bare life” - the simple fact of biological life common to living beings - and “good life” - the
transformation of bare life by the state into political life (offered by citizenship). Agamben
argues that sovereign power is established through the production of a political order that
excludes bare life from law in favor of good life. Sovereign power is realized when it enters a
state of exception, wherein the law is suspended (consider emergency powers or martial law)
and, owing to this, the human being is stripped of their rights and reduced to a state of bare life.
Thus, bare life is included by exclusion: excluded from law but presupposed in its exclusion,
Nicholas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion,” Ethnic
and Racial Studies 36, no. 7 (2013).
18
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signifying its simultaneous inclusion. While it is life itself that Agamben analyzes through a lens
of inclusive exclusion (arguing that life is included in politics by means of its exclusion19), the
migrant is particularly vulnerable to this process. In lacking citizenship but existing in relation to
the nation from which they lack citizenship, the migrant finds themself inclusively excluded.
This is not a simple matter of geographic localization, for simply being located within national
borders does not alone qualify a migrant as “included.” Rather, in being rendered an illegal
presence within a particular nation-state, the migrant is promptly excluded from citizenship and
the protection provided by that nation-state; yet, in their exclusion and designation of a particular
legal status, the migrant is presupposed and subject to the laws set forth by that nation-state,
included too under the jurisdiction of that nation-state. The key distinction here is not simply that
the migrant is both included and excluded, it is that they are included by way o f their exclusion.
The migrant’s state of inclusive exclusion is fundamentally at odds with the logic of the
citizen, whose identity is contingent on an excluded body. Haddad details the status of a migrant
who finds themself in this space of indistinction in relation to the citizen: “The citizen is
unproblematic and rooted in her territorial space. The refugee constitutes a problem by lacking
effective state representation and protection; she is uprooted, dislocated and displaced.”20 The
migrant becomes problematized as they signify an abnormality in a system constituted of
membership communities, where citizenship designates belonging, for this logic means the
migrant does not belong anywhere.21 It is nearly impossible to exist between nation-states within
a nationalized order, yet by existing between the dichotomous categories of inclusion and
exclusion set by international society, the inclusively excluded migrant challenges the notion that
Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life ( California: Stanford University Press, 1998)  7.
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every individual belongs to a nation-state. As their transnational experience resists the logic of
the nation-state, the migrant launches into question the legitimacy of state sovereignty, and
exposes the imagined foundation on which the modern nation-state and its borders are
constructed.
Following her examination of the citizen/migrant relation, Haddad adds, “And if
questions of membership, territory and legitimacy become security issues, persons will
accordingly be given ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status. Each individual will either add to the internal
security of the community or threaten its cohesion by not belonging.”22 Haddad’s emphasis on
security issues is critical in understanding the role of the migrant in the international system.
Here, however, I would argue that “questions of membership, territory, and legitimacy” always
become security issues for the nation-state, as membership, territory, and legitimacy are
fundamental tenets of national sovereignty, and any force that questions or destabilizes the
sovereignty of a nation-state instantly threatens to expose the constructedness of that state. The
risk of that exposure could mean the nation’s loss of sovereign identity in the eyes of its citizens.
Campbell discusses how the identity of a nation-state may come to be threatened: “The mere
existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different
identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the true
identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.”23 The migrant’s intrinsic
state of in-between, emblemized by their simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, runs the risk of
disrupting the cohesive conventions of statehood, citizenship, and externality. The migrant does
intrinsically pose a threat to the security of the nation-state; however, the risk posed does not
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target national economic or social security. Rather, it is the security of national legitimacy - it the
nation-state’s role as a sovereign power, the nation-state’s security of identity.

Specticality
Confronted by the threat of the migrant, the nation-state has no choice but to respond. In
the face of a threat that risks exposing the nation-state’s constructedness, one could argue that the
most likely response of that nation-state is to eliminate the threat entirely. Yet, as I have stated,
this is a matter of security - not economic or public security - but sovereign security. Owing to
this fact, the instinctive response to such a threat becomes nebulous; the nation-state has the dual
task of confronting the threat in such a way that both reinforces its own sovereignty and
simultaneously conceals its construction. It is true that when facing an external threat to its
security, the sovereign government of a nation-state is likely to respond by enacting policy that
minimizes that external threat. However, to ordain policy publicly on the basis of protecting
itself from delegitimation would simply expose what the nation-state is trying to conceal: the
intangibility of its own borders, the fragility of its claim to sovereignty. Rather, the nation must
take a different course of action - one that flaunts the danger presented by the migrant, only to
falsely redirect the perceived recipient of that danger from its own legitimacy to the security and
prosperity of its citizens.

Performative Production
But how is such a process achieved? I argue that the state weaponizes foreign policy, and
the discourse it provides, in order to transform the migrant-border relation into a politically
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advantageous spectacle. Campbell states that foreign policy is a “specific sort of
boundary-producing political performance.”24 According to Campbell, nation-states are able to
make use of discourse that reinforces the image of the migrant as a hazard to the public in order
to similarly reinforce who is the insider and who is the outsider, who is citizen and who is
foreign - and it is largely through migrant-oriented policy that these “discourses of danger” are
strengthened. What is key here is the concept of performativity: a form of discursive power, in
which, through language, a particular phenomena is produced in order to be controlled and
regulated. In manufacturing discourse that paints outsiders as threats which must be contained,
the nation-state is able to reinforce not only insider-outsider discourse, but the notion that the
border is a barrier used to further delineate those two categories. Thus, the border, an inorganic
referential point at the juncture of two nation-states, becomes a nearly tangible entity that has
been fortified through discourses of danger.

The Border Spectacle
A critical element to the “boundary-producing political performance” that Campbell
names is specticality. Through the diffusion of particular discursive elements, a particular issue
becomes a public spectacle, allowing for the generation or reinforcement of a certain kind of
discourse pertaining to that issue. For example, U.S. President Donald Trump’s highly publicized
construction of a border wall, which he has openly supported since his 2016 campaign, is a
spectacle - his increased securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border reinforces the perception of the
border as an entity that must be securitized to the point of impenetrability, conveying the migrant
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as an imminent threat and legitimizing anti-migrant sentiment. In a broader sense, the
ever-growing exhibition of militarization, raids, deportations and detentions that has come to
define many national borders creates what Nicholas De Genova refers to as the “Border
Spectacle.” The Border Spectacle, De Genova argues, uses discourses of danger to supply a
scene of exclusion that generates anti-migrant sentiment. I argue that the greatest purveyor of
this spectacle is migrant-oriented policy. For instance, policies that criminalize unauthorized
border crossings and broaden actions for which an individual may be deported reinforce the
conflation of migrants and criminal behavior. Similarly, those which restrict migration according
to financial status (often termed “public charge”laws) reaffirm the notion that migrants
undermine national prosperity. Strategies aimed at securitizing national borders not only
embolden the image of the border as a divide between the included and the excluded, but fortify
the image of the foreigner, and especially the migrant, as a dangerous figure who must be met
with militant securitization. Policies like these contribute to pre-existing assumptions that
determine migrants to be threats to national security, and they are furthered alongside
governmental campaigns, statements, and discourse accompanying the policy that promote - to
varying degrees - the notion that there is at least some truth to those assumptions.
De Genova’s analysis of specticality as it pertains to the border is fundamental to the
function of the nation-state, not only as it distinguishes insiders from outsiders, but how it allows
the nation-state to legitimize itself before the eyes of its citizens. The state is able to reinforce its
own legitimacy by offering to provide security to its citizens, who, it argues, would otherwise
face immense danger at the hand of migrants.25 De Genova furthers his argument in his assertion
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that the Border Spectacle is not simply a means of portraying the migrant as a danger to national
security and prosperity, but a guise for inclusion - specifically, the subordinate inclusion of the
migrant. He writes,

The more that the Border Spectacle generates anti-immigrant controversy, the more that
the veritable inclusion of those incessantly targeted for exclusion proceeds apace. The
'inclusion' of these deportable migrants, of course, is finally devoted to the subordination
of their labour, which can be best accomplished only to the extent that their incorporation
is permanently beleaguered with the kinds of exclusionary and commonly racist
campaigns that ensure that this inclusion is itself, precisely, a form of subjugation.26
Accoridng to De Genova, the scene of exclusion that the Border Spectacle creates is, in
fact, a guise for the inclusion of migrants as means of subordinating their labor. Thus, the
migrant once again bridges the divide between inclusion and exclusion, feeding the scene of
exclusion created by the Border Spectacle while truly facing inclusion on the basis of
subjugation. While I do not entirely concur with the notion that the purpose of the migrant’s
covert inclusion is only to exploit their labor, I believe that De Genova and Campbell have both
demonstrated an indisputable truth about foreign policy and the hazardization of the migrant: the
nation-state is not attempting to eliminate the threat the migrant poses through its foreign policy.
Instead, it aims to disseminate discursive elements that, in the words of Campbell, are required
by the nation-state to “provide a new theology of truth about who and what ‘we’ are by
highlighting who or what ‘we’ are not, and what ‘we’ have to fear.”27 The migrant is indelibly a
key to the self-production of the nation-state’s identity: the nation necessitates the migrant’s
externality to reinforce the citizen’s internality. The hazard of the migrant, which foreign policy
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consistently demonstrates, is not a threat to the nation-state’s security or prosperity: rather, it is
the thing on which a nation-state’s identity is conditional. Without the promise of danger offered
by the migrant, the nation-state would be unable to provide a scene of exclusion that both
redefines the inclusion/exclusion binary for its citizen while also muting the migrant’s inclusive
exclusion. Ultimately, in order for the state to be secure, it must simultaneously and categorically
be insecure.

A Necessary Threat
The insecurity posed by the migrant provides a necessary ground for promotion of the
inclusion/exclusion binary and the masking of inclusive exclusion, and truly begins to reveal
how vital the migrant is to the mechanics of the nation-state. Fundamentally, it is the
nation-state’s own identity to which the migrant is essential - as are the borders that define
international migration between nation-states. Campbell writes, “Were there no borders, there
would be no danger, but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of
possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the
containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders.”28 What Campbell highlights here is
the necessity of borders - not as means of preventing danger, but of generating it. His central
argument p roposes that foreign policy is a political practice vital to the production and
maintenance of American political identity:

...this argument proposes that United States foreign policy be understood as a political
practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of American political
identity. In order to delineate more precisely the relationship between foreign policy and
28
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political identity, this argument is predicated on a reconceptualization of understandings
to which the conventional view of international relations and foreign policy is deeply
indebted - most specifically, a reconceptualization of identity and the state.29

While Campbell focuses largely on the self-legitimation process that is facilitated when
the state is able to enact foreign policy and make a promise of security to its citizens.
Furthermore, I wish to observe the dire consequences such policy has for not
foreigners, but migrants. I argue that it is not only the false discourses of danger, promulgated by
the sovereign government, that is required in national identity-making. The true threat the
migrant poses - that which challenges the logic of national sovereignty and identity-making
through the ambiguity and abnormality of the migrant’s membership status - is crucial to the
dynamic process of producing and maintaining the sovereignty of the nation-state. As the
national citizen requires the foreigner, against whom they may forge their identity, the
nation-state requires the migrant - whom they do not forge their identity against, but with. T
 he
migrant’s lack of belonging and national representation, coupled with their relation to
border-crossing, may challenge the logic of national sovereignty, yet it also provides the
nation-state with an integral piece to the political machine of identity-building, without which,
the political machine would be unable to function. That piece is the migrant, from whom the
nation-state may promise its citizens protection, but also, who will ultimately serve as the target
of the violence, exploitation, and erasure necessary in fulfilling that promise. I argue that it is the
fulfillment of the promise of protection to its citizens that legitimizes the nation-state, and that
such a promise is not fulfilled by the enacting of anti-migrant policy, but the brutal subjugation
sanctioned and implemented by that policy. Paradoxically, if a nation-state wishes to be secure it
29

Ibid., 9.

24
must also be insecure, requiring a threat that is both immanent and external in order to forge a
relationship in which the citizen feels dependent on their nation to provide safety and security. In
doing so, the nation-state may at last find its legitimation and fortification.
In what follows, I will demonstrate that the border, emphasized as a barrier between
citizen and foreigner, is intended to conceal the actual function of national boundaries. The
border is truly a processing agent, which exploits both the migrant’s lack of state representation
as well as their relation to border-crossing, in order to forcibly depoliticize them and expose
them to sovereign violence - rendering them as existing in a semi-permanent state of
inclusive-exclusion and bare life. Agamben refers to this state of being as the state of exception:

“...the sovereign exception is the fundamental localization (Ortung) , which does not limit
itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead traces a threshold
(the state of exception) between the two, on the basis of which outside and inside, the
normal situation and chaos, enter into those complex topological relations that make the
validity of the juridical order possible...The exception is what cannot be included in the
whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always
included.” 30
Excluded from citizenship in the nation whose borders the migrant intends, attempts, and
succeeds in crossing, they are also included by way of subjection to that nation’s laws. However,
in lacking political life, or citizenship, the migrant is rendered defenseless against sovereign
violence. This violence - sanctioned by policy that is inherently necropolitical - contributes to the
inevitable disenfranchisement and erasure undergone by migrants, who have little choice other
than to become less visible than the average citizen or remain exposed to the very sovereign that
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imparts violence upon them. Meanwhile, the spectacle of the militarized physical border, as well
as the discourse on unauthorized migrants and the danger they pose, render migrants selectively
visible on the part of the nation-state. Having subdued and subjugated the migrant, the sovereign
government is able to decide how, when, and where the migrant and the issues that surround
them become visible to the public eye. The nation’s control over the public image of the migrant
primarily allows false discourses of danger to be easily disseminated amongst the citizenry.
Subsequently, the widespread erasure of the migrant, who may have been imprisoned, killed, or
exploited, misleads the citizen to believe that the government has successfully staved the
impending waves of migrants at the border. In this, the nation-state has fulfilled the promise of
security that it offered its citizens, protecting them from the supposedly imminent threat of the
migrant. However, as Campbell notes, this process of promise and fulfillment is unending:

In other words, states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of
identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the
performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed...stasis would be death.31

Conclusion
Effectively, the nation-state is caught in a never-ending cycle of identity-production,
ceaselessly engaging in the manufacturing of a threat from which it may offer to protect its
citizens in an unyielding quest for legitimacy. Were the nation-state to cease this cycle of
production, it would run the risk of a foundational collapse, as national sovereignty depends on
the citizenry’s belief in its own legitimacy and the concealment of its constructed nature. The
logic of the stateless person may innately be at odds with the logic of statehood, as it destabilizes
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the key principle of inclusion and exclusion upon which the nation-state is grounded; however,
that destabilization may be redirected into characterizing the migrant as a false threat to national
security and prosperity, ultimately serving the dual purpose of quelling the threat to legitimacy
and reinforcing the national identity. This process is only aided by the migrant’s purgatorial state
of being; their inclusive-exclusion places them beyond the conventional logic of statehood and
thus affords them protection against the violent exploitation and subordination foisted upon them
by the state. The migrant’s ambiguity and abnormality within a nationalized world renders them
the ideal target for this process, laying them bare to the violent manipulation employed by the
nation-state as means of reinforcing its own sovereignty.
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Chapter 2: The Border
Sovereign Violence and the Production of Sacred Life

I now aim to provide an in-depth analysis of national borders and their role in the fortification of
the nation-state. Primarily, I urge readers to keep in mind that no two borders are the same. They
are shaped, securitized, and perceived according to a vast array of social, political, and economic
dynamics that are unique to the societies that surround them. The process of bordering that I
describe in this chapter likely applies to different national borders to vastly different degrees and,
similarly, manifests in a variety of ways pertaining to unique national and cultural dynamics.
That being said, I believe that such a process finds the most strength among the dynamics of
global hegemony and historic colonization that thrive at borders separating the so-called “Global
North” from the “Global South.” The following chapter will consist of three parts: first, I will
discuss the conventional wisdom that surrounds the territorially-bound national border and
destabilize it, examining borders as not a spatial entity but an aphysical one that serves as a
condition of being rather than a boundary. In the next section, I will consider how this fact
illuminates a process of rendering undergone by migrants who cross national borders, subverting
the perceived binary of citizenship. In the third and final section, I analyze how such a process
contributes to the erasure and exploitation of the migrant for the purpose of sovereign
self-reproduction. Ultimately, I intend to illustrate the national border not as a barrier that
distinguishes insider from outsider, but as a boundless and exploitative rendering process that
intends to convert migrants into subordinate bodies, upon which the sovereign nation-state may
capitalize.

28
Border Localization
Banality
The conventional premise of the national border maintains a territorial and spatial
indication, as it supposedly refers to the boundary that sits between one nation-state and the next.
This conventional perception of a national border perpetuates the notion that the border is a
barrier between insider and outsider, and the spectacle of militarization that often occurs at
national borders only reinforces this impression. However, border politics and policing may be
traced far beyond the border and even beyond the borderlands, materializing along the complex
dynamics of deportations, detentions, raids, and the importation of (often unauthorized) migrant
labor. In order for the border spectacle - which that characterizes the border as a boundary of
protection between insiders and outsiders - to be maintained, then, the state must rely on the
making of those complex internal dynamics as banal.
Shahram Khosravi’s Illegal Traveler is an exploration of statelessness, as the author uses
his own experiences as a stateless person to craft a unique “auto-ethnography” of national
borders and the violence imposed upon him as a border-crosser. “Banality,” he states, “is always
a crucial feature of political brutality.”32 The term “banal” is defined as such a total lack of
originality as to actually be trite and obvious, indicating a kind of commonness or ordinary
quality about the thing deemed “banal.” Khosravi here suggests that political brutality requires
banality to function, depending on its own profusion to effectively desensitize a population into
regarding that specific violence as commonplace and largely insignificant. De Genova too
discusses banality in his assessment of the Border Spectacle, arguing,
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...the ever-increasingly militarized spectacle of apprehensions, raids, detentions and
deportations always accompanies the banality of a continuous importation of
'unauthorized' migrant labour. All non-citizens, inasmuch as they are construed as such
(whether as migrants or asylum seekers), are overtly figured in one or another juridical
relation to the authority of a territorially defined ('national') state.33
Interestingly, De Genova demonstrates here how one aspect of the national border securitization - can be emphasized as anomalous in order to further banalize another aspect importation of labor. Khosravi and De Genova’s consideration of banality carefully exposes a
legacy of normalization that is instrumental in the production of border politics and sovereign
violence. Furthermore, the banality of border politics reveals something else: before I attempt to
deconstruct border and its operation within the modern nation-state, I must first explore the
political production of its supposed “banality,” deconstructing the standard perception of what a
national border actually is and considering the boundary-like quality borders are presupposed as
having - in opposition to their true function. To begin, I must ask a simple question: where is the
border?

Localization
The conventional wisdom surrounding this question indicates that national borders are
semi-tangible sutures that emerge where one country meets another, functioning as the boundary
between the citizens of one nation and the next. While the boundary itself may not be physical, it
can be distinguished by a number of material factors: at some borders there may be barbed-wire
fences, walls, checkpoints, or officers; at others, nothing but the natural elements that long
preceded the nation-state’s existence, unfettered by man-made structures of inclusion and
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exclusion but still exemplifying boundary-ness, such as bodies of water or deserts. The territories
across which those borders transverse may be referred to as “borderlands,” and, in some
circumstances, communities on either side of a border function as one, unbridled by national
constraints. All that I have just described indicates that the border is innately physically
localized; that there is an ingrained situational element to borders wherein they only occur as one
nation-state meets the next. This is due, in part, to the question I posed. To ask “where is the
border?” assumes that the border exists in certain places and not in others - a notion that is only
reinforced by the Border Spectacle.
In revisiting De Genova’s concept of the Border Spectacle, I intend to examine how it
functions through the dissemination of highly-public discourse and imagery that strengthen the
public perception of the border as a dangerous boundary, which the government must securitize
through heightened militarization and advanced technology (such as drones and motion sensors.)
34

Through various discursive practices, border securitization is touted as a virtuous measure

intended to protect the innocent citizens within from the migrants without, who would otherwise
threaten national safety and prosperity through practices such as drug trade, violent crime, and
cultural degradation. Still, the narrative that all migrants are inherently dangerous is unlikely to
convince every citizen of a single nation-state. Those citizens who feel compassion for
asylum-seekers, particularly those with knowledge of any persecution and strife that motivated
their journey, are likely to believe refugees should be allowed passage past the border in search
of a better life. Here lies an alternative method of the Border Spectacle: the promotion of border
enforcement strategies as though they are benevolent towards not just citizens, but migrants too.
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A compelling example of this is the discourse surrounding human smuggling and trafficking35
pertaining to the border. Reece Jones argues that border securitization practices are often
portrayed as righteous initiatives “that can protect innocent migrants from unscrupulous human
traffickers who have a wanton disregard for the lives of their human cargo.”36 As migration is
criminalized, smugglers provide a useful scapegoat, depicted in the media and by government
officials as violent purveyors of migrant death.37 Khosravi maintains that this is not always the
case, providing as an example that the vast majority of migrant deaths (usually by drowning) in
the sea along Spanish-African borders happen as a result of interception practices employed by
Spanish immigration authorities.38 Nevertheless, this discourse of humanitarianism works to
remedy the concerns of citizens who find themselves concerned about the fate of “good”
migrants, “refugees” as opposed to drug dealers and violent criminals. In the same vein, one
could even argue that the asylum process is itself an integral proponent of the Border Spectacle,
widely considered to be an exclusive path to citizenship for those who “deserve” it; while, in
truth, leaving vast numbers of migrants behind in times of crisis. The myth of border
securitization as an act of benevolence towards migrants eases the conscience of citizens while
also fostering a paternalistic narrative: one that illustrates an idealistic portrait of the nation-state,
extending a generous hand to the helpless, needy migrant.
The Border Spectacle, then, functions to promote the image of a border as a sort of
physical boundary, that (to varying degrees of efficacy) stops dangerous migrants in their tracks
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while ushering in “deserving” migrants. The understanding of the border as a purely physical
entity, as emphasized by the Border Spectacle, contributes to the perception of national borders
as inherently bounded and localized at a specific geographical point. While a national border is
most widely understood to be located at the juncture of two nation-states, De Genova describes
border spaces to be a far more “variegated spectrum,” encompassing points of entry within
nations, such as airports - where migrants undergo inspection by authorities and are issued
documents which may be issued and violated, such as visas. He concludes,
...it is not any specific constellation of enforcement practices (such as the admittedly
more sensational militarized patrols of land and sea frontiers) that constitute the
conditions of possibility for the spectacle of immigration enforcement at 'the' border, so
much as the mere fact that borders are indeed enacted (and thus performed) through such
practices.39
De Genova is highlighting a crucial truth about national borders: they are not an inevitable seam
between one country and another, but an aphysical dimension produced through a series of
practices perpetuated by border politics and policing. While it is true that the territoriality
appropriated to national borders, through law and through discourse, make real an element of
physicality that I do not wish to take for granted in this discussion of borders, border policing is
carried out far beyond borders and borderlands, as is the resulting social impact. The aphysical
border is ultimately invoked through a series of such practices that presuppose a person’s lack of
political belonging. These practices may be employed at any place and time within the nation
state, not just at the convergence of two nation-states, and they reveal the true fundamental
localization of national borders: the border is not located in regards to territory, as they are not
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positioned physically; rather, borders are located politically, at the intersection of sovereignty
and statelessness.
Regarding borders, Khosravi writes, “Borders symbolize the sovereignty of states. A
nation-state can be imagined (Anderson 1983) only through its borders. The nationstate system is
based on the functional nexus between a determinate localization (territory) and a determinate
order (the state).”40 Borders, as a lens through which the territoriality of the nation-state system
may be illuminated, seem to serve a purpose of delineating where the agents of sovereignty may
righteously operate. However, too often this image of national borders as a tool of definition
allow borders to be perceived as a hollow outline, within which an order of sovereignty operates.
In fact, the interiority of the nation-state in its entirety is precisely where borders are ever-present
and capable of being enacted - without regard to the proximity to neighboring nations. According
to De Genova,
To the extent that the entirety of the interior of the space of the state becomes a
regulatory zone of immigration enforcement, and as borders appear to be increasingly
ungrounded – both internalized and externalized – the efficacy of the Border Spectacle in
fact is merely intensified. As the border is effectively everywhere, so also is the spectacle
of its enforcement and therefore its violation, rendering migrant 'illegality' ever more
unsettlingly ubiquitous.41
What De Genova articulates here is the correspondence between a migrant’s inclusive exclusion
and the positionality of the national border: migrant ‘illegality’ provides the scene for the
inevitable inflation of the border - an inflation that renders a border so boundless that it becomes
invisible. Khosravi discusses this invisibility:
Through ‘inclusive exclusion’ (Agamben 1998:17), undesirable people – ‘illegal’
migrants, refugees and quasi-citizens – are positioned on the threshold between in and
40
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out. Their experience is indistinct from the operation of the nation-state and their very
existence is indistinct from the border (Raj 2006). By rebordering politics, the sovereign
power does not merely exclude undesirable people, but penalizes and regulates them, by
immobilizing them in detention centres, by ignominious and terrifying threats of
deportation, or by racialized internal border control – all of which turns the citizen into a
quasi-citizen. As Balibar puts it, ‘some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all’
in the geographical or political sense of the term (2002:84). Borders have become
invisible borders, situated everywhere and nowhere. Hence, undesirable people are not
expelled by the border, they are forced to be border (ibid).42
The United States serves as a fine example of “rebordering politics”: While the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. constitution protects people from random stops and searches, the federal
government claims the power to conduct certain kinds of warrantless stops a “reasonable
distance” from the border - 100 air miles from any external boundary in the U.S.. Two thirds of
the U.S. population is located in this 100-mile zone, as are most of the largest cities in the
country, including New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
agents carry out certain tasks that demonstrate the exceptionality of the region from the Fourth
Amendment, including the operation of checkpoints on major highways and secondary roads, at
which every motorist is stopped and asked for their immigration status. CBP is also charged with
conducting roving patrols and public transit inspections in this 100-mile zone, and, for those
questioned, the only legal protection from detention is a vague principle that states a person may
not be detained without “reasonable suspicion.”43 While the purpose of CBP is to patrol borders
and the territory 100 miles inward of the border, the purpose of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is mainly to operate where CBP is not - that is to say, throughout the
interiority of the country. Some of the operations of ICE include workplace raids, apprehensions
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of unauthorized migrants, and migrant detention. General police officers may also question a
person’s legal status, meaning the migrant is at risk of deportation or detention if they are
approached by officers even during day-to-day activities, such as driving or walking.
The border and immigration policy of the United States is only one example of
rebordering politics, but it serves as a powerful testimony to the omnipresence of the border
throughout the interiority of the nation state. When a migrant crosses a national border, they are
entering into a space where they remain subject to the border securitization - revealing that the
border is not physically localized, but carried with t he migrant and conjured as the sovereignty of
the nation-state contends with the migrant’s own statelessness. The ambiguity of statelessness
casts into question the entirety of national logic, threatening to expose its constructedness; the
nation-state, in response, invokes the border to mitigate that threat. As I have emphasized,
however, the nation-state does not wish to simply eliminate the threat of the migrant. Instead, I
argue that the state weaponizes the border’s optimal function: as a rendering agent that forcibly
depoliticizes the migrant, ultimately exposing them to the forces of sovereign violence.

Homo Sacer and the Border Rendering Process

Intersectional Identities and the Border
Reflecting on his own experiences and the experiences of others, Khosravi asserts,
“Migrants pay the price of rebordering and debordering policies: they are sacrificed in the ritual
of renegotiating the borders.”44 His emphasis on the sacrificial provides a compelling foundation
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upon which I may question the true function of the national border - not as a boundary, but an
inescapable and exploitative rendering process that transforms migrants into politically
serviceable bodies for the nation state. I have established how the border is inescapable insofar as
a migrant’s relation to border-crossing subjects them (and those who hope to aid their journey) to
the “illegality” imposed upon them by the state. I will now address how the national border relies
on the exploitation of preexisting inequities that are racial, cultural, sexual, gendered, and
economic in order to forcibly depoliticize the migrant and reduce them to a state of bare life.
According to Khosravi, “...borders regulate movements of people. While a small category
of people enjoy unrestricted mobility rights, most people are caught within borders. The
regulation of mobility operates through social sorting that involves sexual, gender, racial and
class inequalities.”45 He first points to Eurocentric global hegemony in order to detail the
racialization of borders, noting the importance of having “the ability to translate one’s life story
into Eurocentric juridical language and to perform the role expected of the refugee” in order to
successfully obtain refugee status. He references an experience of his own, in which he and
others were advised to wear dirty clothes to their UNHCR interview in order to appear “sad” and
“profound.”46 Racial divisions are especially pronounced at the borders that define the so called
“Global North” from the “Global South” - for instance, the Mediterranean EU border, which has
been increasingly subject to crossings by African and Middle Eastern migrants since the 2010s;
or the Southwestern U.S. border, which also hosts a vast number of migrants from Mexico and
Central American countries such as Honduras and El Salvador. These borders, two of the
deadliest in the world,47 and the movement surrounding them are particularly subject to the
Ibid., 2 .
Ibid., 34.
47
Jones, “Violent Borders,” 5.
45
46

37
emergence of racialized discourse that, owing to the perceived racial and cultural differences
between the “insiders” and the “outsiders,” further fosters the dehumanization of the migrant. As
the racial and/or cultural background of migrants comes into question alongside this
conventional discourse, rhetoric that portrays them as threatening or disadvantageous is only
emboldened. Racialized discourse regarding migrants also contributes to the rhetoric of
deservedness as it is applied to the migrant, determining who “deserves” status such as refugee
status, and, inevitably, who “deserves” to migrate away from persecution, economic strife, and
other factors that produce migration - as with Khosravi’s example, he would be perceived as
more deserving of asylum status were he to conform to standards of what a refugee from the
Middle East should look like according to ill-informed Eurocentric standards.
As they are racialized, borders are similarly gendered and sexualized. Khosravi details
how sexual assault is linked to border crossing, writing,
One sexual aspect of borders is the rape of border crossers. Women and, to a lesser
extent, men run the risk of being raped not only by bandits and smugglers but also by
border guards. Rape at borders is systematic, occurs routinely and follows a similar
pattern along borders in different places. Rape has become a mechanism of border
control.48
Sexual violation in regards to borders is, in some ways, different from sexual assault in war or in
prison, Khosravi argues, as it functions not necessarily or independently as means of punishing
or defeating the enemy but more so as a “tariff” - highlighting how women are often raped by
border guards as a price for safe passage (specifically referring to this practice as it occurs at the
U.S.-Mexico Border).49 He adds that authorities are unlikely to hold these rapists accountable,
which reveals a patriarchal quality of the nation state as it is based in conflating militarization,
48
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masculinity, and securitization.50 He also notes the risks faced by migrants who are not
heterosexual or cisgender face a higher risk for violence and discrimination by smugglers,
bandits, border guards, and asylum interviewers.51
The national border also facilitates economic exploitation and discrimination of migrants.
Khosravi notes that unauthorized migrants are likely to be robbed, not only by bandits but by
border agents before they are taken into custody. Even authorized migrants, adds Khosravi, are
subject to robbing and bribery - if the migrant fails to comply, they could be arrested.52 “Public
charge” policy is also grounded on the basis of economic discrimination and again facilitates the
rhetoric of “deservedness” - citing economic security claims to disqualify migrants from
inclusion based on their own prosperity, and contending that migrants who do not breach a
certain threshold of wealth will provide an unfair burden on the state’s welfare system.
The exploitation of the migrant is intersectional, and I aim to draw upon this fact to
emphasize that there is no singular migrant experience. Any attempt to dissect broad social
dynamics, such as my attempt here with border politics and migrant exploitation, is inherently
homogenizing to some degree as it presupposes a shared experience between a vast number of
individuals. Therefore, I feel it important to simultaneously highlight the hazard of
homogenization - not only in that it reduces the experiences of individuals to such a degree that
may be both dehumanizing and dismissive of their agency, but also in that to homogenize such a
great quantity of experiences underestimates the powerful mechanics at work within the border’s
true function. The exploitation a migrant may face during or after they cross a border is highly
and intentionally individualized. The subordination imposed on migrants by border politics relies
50
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upon existing discourse, whether it be racialized, sexualized, economized, or other. It is for this
reason that the bordering process is so difficult to see and understand: it doesn’t exist on its own,
but grounds itself in preexisting discourse to allow for maximum efficacy. This rendering
process is indeed so powerful because it adapts to strategically wield existing prejudice and
inequity, allowing the state to shift the migrant’s own narrative in a way that serves national
interests - for example, in one instance using an image of a hardened adult male’s mugshot to
demonstrate the necessity of border securitization against criminals, and in the next using the
image of a downtrodden little girl to demonstrate the benevolence of the state as it provides
asylum status.
The implications of such images fuel a powerful discursive dynamic within the
nation-state, and other implications that are far more subtle can be found even in everyday
language. Khrosavi also addresses the “animalization” of the terminology used to discuss
migration, which often designates animal names to migrants and even smugglers. These terms
include names such as the Spanish pollos (chickens) for Mexican border crossers and coyote for
the smuggler; the Iranian gosfand (sheep) for “illegal” border crossers; and renshe ( human
snakes) for smuggled Chinese people and shetou (snakehead) for Chinese smugglers.53 He
concludes, “Dehumanized and represented in terms of chicken and sheep – two animals
traditionally sacrificed in rituals – the border transgressors are sacrificial creatures for the border
ritual.”54 The element of “sacrifice” that Khosravi repeatedly mentions is truly vital to an
understanding of how the border, in its ubiquitousness and exploitativeness, functions efficiently
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and brutally to transform the migrant into exactly what the nation-states requires it to be: a homo
sacer.
Homo Sacer
To understand what constitutes the homo sacer, it is necessary to first understand the
distinction between “bare life” and “good life” as provided by Agamben in Homo Sacer:
Sovereign Power and Bare Life. H
 e contends that law has always claimed the authority to
distinguish “bare life” from “good life” - essentially distinguishing biological life, or bodies,
from political life, or citizenship. By assuming the authority to make this exclusive distinction,
the law makes bare life the subject of its political control. Building on the works of Carl Schmitt,
Agamben draws upon the concept of a “state of exception,” a condition in which law is
suspended by the sovereign. Agamben identifies the state of exception as having become the
norm in contemporary politics through the unfettered use of practices such as emergency powers
and martial law, leaving the law in practice but with no substantial meaning. He explains,
The sovereign exception is the presupposition of the juridical reference in the form of its
suspension. Inscribed as the presupposed exception in every rule that orders or forbids
something (for example, in the rule that forbids homicide) is the pure and unsanctionable
figure of the offense, that, in the normal case, brings about the rule’s own transgression
(in the same example, the killing of a man not as natural violence but as sovereign
violence in the state of exception.)55

Agamben concludes that bare life is caught in a particular relation to sovereign power known as
“the sovereign ban.” The condition of abandonment occurs as those who exist within the state of
exception cannot be liberated from sovereign rule; through its own exclusion, the law applies in
no longer applying - the subject is both turned over to the law and abandoned by it. In order to
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illustrate this state of dual inclusion and abandonment, Agamben references a figure of Roman
law known as the homo sacer. U
 nder the laws of the Roman Empire, a man who committed a
particular kind of crime had his citizenship revoked and was thereby forcibly reduced to only his
bare life. In this, he became a homo sacer, or “sacred man,” whose life was deemed “sacred”56 so
he could not be sacrificed in a ritual ceremony, but in his lack of citizenship or political life,
could be killed by anybody with impunity.57 Agamben explains the homo sacer a s such:
The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not
permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide;
in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that ‘if someone kills the one who is sacred
according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide.’ This is why it is
customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.58

Further, he adds,
Just as the law, in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case in no longer
applying and in withdrawing from it, so homo sacer belongs to God in the form of
unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form of being able to be killed.
Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life.59
The homo sacer, Agamben argues, is the the foundation upon which modern democracy
has drawn from classical politics and developed itself: the first tenet of political life is life that
may be killed.60 It is not just the simple fact of life, Agamben claims, but life exposed to death
(as bare life is exposed to death as a sacred man) that is the originary political element: “The
banishment of sacred life is the sovereign nomos that conditions every rule, the originary
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spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and every territorialization.”61
He concludes, “The very body of homo sacer is, in its capacity to be killed but not sacrificed, a
living pledge to his subjection to the power of death.”62 The homo sacer represents the inclusive
exclusion of natural life and it is upon the inclusive exclusion of particular bodies that sovereign
violence is founded. Therefore, it is life, exposed to death, in regards to which sovereign
violence is generated.63 According to Agamben, the concentration camp is the most salient
manifestation of sovereign power, as the place in which bare life is most brazenly seized by the
state. In the concentration camp, Agamben argues, a space emerges where the state of exception
becomes the rule and, as such, law and life become indistinguishable. He references the fact that,
in Nazi Germany, Jews could be sent to the extermination camps only after they had been fully
denationalized and stripped of citizenship.64
Necropolitics
I argue, then, that the primary function of the national border is to forcibly reduce the
migrant to a state of bare life, rendering them a homo sacer. T
 he conversion of the migrant to a
homo sacer is achieved through their relation to the border; this relation, working in conjunction
with the structural inequities it exploits as well as the “illegality” surrounding migration,
effectively extracts the migrant from their political life. In doing so, the migrant is placed in a
semi-permanent, selective state of exception, leaving them fully exposed to forces of sovereign
violence. This sovereign violence, carried out through numerous direct and indirect apparati of
the state, is a manifestation of what is termed “necropolitics” - defined as the sovereign
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instrumentalization of death. In the end, the chief function of the border is to exploit and
subordinate the migrant through necropolitical means, ultimately serving the state’s cyclical
process of self-legitimation.
The originary political element being not life, but life exposed to death, indicates a
necropolitical landscape upon which modern sovereignty is founded. Necropolitics, a concept
first explored in depth by Achille Mbembe, accounts for the killing of individuals by a sovereign
body, not insofar as they are guilty of committing any sort of crime, but as they are groups whose
deaths are perceived to benefit the remaining populations.65 In the words of Khosravi, “The
modern nation-state has claimed the right to preside over the distinction between useful
(legitimate) and wasted (illegitimate) lives (Bauman 2004:33).”66 The practice of necropolitics is
not simply the practice of killing, but the practice of exposing others to death; the practice of
deciding who can live and who must die. “To kill or to allow to live,” argues Mbembe,
“constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes. To exercise sovereignty is to
exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power.”
67

In order to demonstrate the employment necropolitics in all its forms, Mbembe draws on

“topographies of cruelty” such as the colony and the plantation, referencing historical instances
such as aparthied in South Africa, chattel slavery, war, suicide bombings, and the colonization of
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Palestine. He includes stateless people in refugee camps, alongside the settlement of new
colonies and mass expulsions, among the practices that are “underwritten by the sacred terror of
truth and exclusivity.”68 Like Agamben, Mbembe cites the state of exception and declares that it
is the normative basis of the right to kill, writing,

In such instances, power (and not necessarily state power) continuously refers and
appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to
produce that same exception, emergency, and fictionalized enemy. In other words, the
question is: What is the relationship between politics and death in those systems that can
function only in a state of emergency?69
Politics, concludes Mbembe, is death living a human life, and as such, sovereignty is the
right to the hazardization of that life.70 Reasoning that sovereignty is expressed primarily as the
right to kill, Mbembe adds, “My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is
not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the
material destruction of human bodies and populations.”71 Inspired by Mbembe’s compelling
analysis of sovereignty and death, I would only object that the instrumentalization of human
existence and destruction of bodies to which he speaks is, in fact, inherently a matter of
sovereign autonomy. I argue instead that the necropower of the state is weaponized against
migrants in order to position them closer to death, effectively achieving their subjugation in a
manner that successfully provides the basis for the reproduction of state sovereignty.

The Spectrum of Citizenship
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The Border Gaze
The migrant, forcibly reduced to bare life a nd rendered a homo sacer b y border politics,
through this process becomes fully exposed to the forces of state necropower. The system that I
have described here is not one of aimless violence, but the cornerstone upon which national
sovereignty is not only constructed, but reproduced over and over again. In order to demonstrate
the migrant’s place in the national quest for sovereignty, I believe a concept Khosravi presents,
known as the “border gaze,” is the essential starting point. “The border gaze,” he alleges, “does
not operate through a simple function of exclusion. It situates immigrants on the ‘threshold’,
between inside and outside...Undesirable immigrants are included without being members.” He
then references Agamben’s analysis of exception: ‘The exception is that which cannot be
included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it
is always already included’ (Agamben 1998:25).”72 According to Khorsravi, the border gaze is
cross-cutting: it is like a complex fabric, hierarchically woven to include factors of race, sex,
gender, and class; and it is cast over a body as perception that determines the visibility of that
body.73 The bodies over which the border gaze is cast are the bodies of “undesirable migrants,”
and those migrants are summarily placed on a threshold, in a zone between inclusion and
exclusion. The border gaze not only perceives migrants on the basis of their migration, but
according to other factors of their identity, reveals the entirely intersectional nature of matters
concerning sovereignty, nationalization, and migration.
Khosravi observes the border gaze as it is an intersection and interaction between
ethnicity, race, gender, and sex. For example, he concludes that women are likely to be targeted
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by the border according to their sexuality and men according to their religion and ethnicity.74 He
illustrates this point by discussing how xenophobic stereotypes (gathered from figures like
Osama Bin Laden and Sadam Hussein) allow a “primitive masculinity” to be ascribed to Muslim
men in Sweden, contributing to the notion that Muslim men not only endanger Muslim women
(who are similarly stereotyped as passive) but also are fundamentally at odds with “civilized”
Western values. Perhaps, Khosravi concludes, this is why women are much more likely to
receive asylum than men.75 “The border gaze,” writes Khosravi, “through its xenophobic mode
of seeing, targets and imperils the lives of undesirable immigrants. ‘Border gaze’, for those
targeted by it, is more than an abstract theoretical concept; it is a highly tangible part of everyday
life. It is forceful and sometimes formidable and deadly.”76 Khosravi’s concept of a “border
gaze” is gripping, as it lays the groundwork for the primary achievement of the border-rendering
process: it is an instrument that determines a person’s positionality in terms of a national border;
in doing so, the border gaze exposes a spectrum of membership wherein that person may qualify
as a citizen, a quasi-citizen, and an anti-citizen.

The Citizen, the Quasi-Citizen, and the Anti Citizen
Khosravi conceived of these terms in his auto-ethnography, stating that as there are
citizens, there are too quasi-citizens and anti-citizens. He defines the anti-citizen as follows: “In
contrast to the ideal citizen, there is the anti-citizen, an individual who exists outside the ordinary
regulatory system, one who violates established norms and who may constitute a risk to the
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safety and quality of life of ‘normal’ citizens.”77 On unauthorized migrants in particular, he
claims,
Undocumented immigrants are seen as anti-citizens because they are considered burdens
on society. They are thought to have a negative effect on welfare and the economy (their
only costs to society are, ironically, the costs associated with their deportation). Above
all, they are portrayed as a ‘labour market problem’. They take jobs with low wages,
which weakens collective agreements. In the end, they endanger the very existence of the
welfare system (see Khosravi 2010). An anti-citizen is portrayed as a criminal, as lacking
identity and as being irrational, irresponsible and immoral...As anti-citizens,
undocumented immigrants are presumed to violate the ‘ethical values’ and ‘morals’ of
citizens.78
According to Khosravi, the anti-citizen is largely antithetical to the citizen, in both their
violation of sociocultural norms and subsequent characterization as a risk to citizens’ quality of
life, security, and prosperity. The anti-citizen is perhaps the subject of the border gaze in its most
unadulterated form, as they have no documentation of citizenship or residency to protect them
from deportation or detention. However, I also believe documentation is not the sole factor that
distinguishes a person’s position on the spectrum of citizenship, and I believe this fact is best
demonstrated not by the anti-citizen but by the quasi-citizen.
Between the anti-citizen and the citizen, claims Khosravi, lies the quasi-citizen. The
quasi-citizen is perhaps the most compelling representation of the liminality of the border gaze,
situated somewhere along the spectrum of citizen and an anti-citizen - a salient product of
inclusive exclusion. A quasi-citizen will likely have undergone some kind of reterritorialization,
such as having attained asylum status, residency, or citizenship. Regardless of any
documentation they might possess, the quasi-citizen retains the residual exposure that was
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imposed upon them by their relation to border-crossing and is resultantly a target for sovereign
violence. In fact, children of migrants who claim birthright citizenship in their country of
residence are likely positioned as quasi-citizens rather than just citizens; by way of their parent’s
relation to border-crossing and subsequent exploitation, the child’s life will be shaped by the
exploitation their parent suffers and may have their citizenship cast into question - and
destabilized - multiple times in their life. Thus, while it may be true that what distinguishes the
anti-citizen from the quasi-citizen and the citizen is their lack of any form of state-sanctioned
reterritorialization, I can conclude that “anti-citizen” and “quasi-citizen” are modes of existence
not entirely determined one’s true legal status. Rather, it seems that anti-citizenship and
quasi-citizenship are a lasting effect of the border gaze that define an individual’s relation to a
national border. The conditions of anti- and quasi-citizenship account for a person’s legal status,
but also elements of their background such as their class, race, lineage, and other factors.
Khosravi determines that he is an example of a quasi-citizen, and provides a specific
example from his own life that represents his quasi-citizen status. A migrant from Iran and
asylum recipient, Khosravi had been a Swedish citizen for over ten years when he was
interrogated and threatened with detention by immigration authorities in an airport while
attempting to enter London. “My status as a Swedish citizen disappeared at the racialized border
because of my face,” he writes, referring to the fact that the basis of the interrogation was
racially motivated on the basis of his appearance.79 Upon his refusal to answer several of the
officer’s questions, Khosravi was informed he could be detained for up to nine days under an act
known as the Anti-Terrorism Act. As a result, he determined that he would rather return to
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Sweden at once than continue attempting to enter London, but the officer stated this was not an
option either until he had answered all of her questions. He recalls,
Put into a petrifying immobility, I could move neither in nor out. I was indistinguishable
from the border; I was the border. When she realized that I had decided to be detained
rather than answer her questions about my parents, she wished me a pleasant time in
Bristol! Suddenly, I was a full EU citizen again with a surplus of mobility rights and
freedom of movement. My legal status as an EU citizen was apparently not fixed, but
rather situational, conditional and unconfirmed. I am a quasi-citizen...I am included and
at the same time excluded.80
Khosravi’s “quasi-citizenship” here demonstrates an oscillation between acknowledged
citizenship and a complete lack of membership, mobilized by his appearance as it distinguished
him from other Swedish citizens and, also, how it defined him as a possible terrorist in the eyes
of this officer - as he was not being detained on the suspicion of simply being an unauthorized
citizen so much as being a possible danger to other Swedish citizens.81 What is also presented in
Khosravi’s experience is how the condition of quasi-citizenship is one that, in fact, does the work
of the state in that it creates a dynamic in which the Border Spectacle is allowed to play out.
While practices of scrutinization may differ depending on the national border and the port of
entry in question, highly visible measures often accompany such experiences, including
questioning and frisking performed publicly before others in the area. While quasi-citizens with
appropriate documentation are likely to be released and allowed to continue their journey, it is
the moment in which their citizenship is publicly scrutinized and cast into uncertainty that
contributes to a spectacle - a spectacle which reinforces the notion of the border as a severe,
physical boundary that must be securitized. Ironically, it is the truly aphysical localization
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between sovereignty and statelessness that renders the border so omnipresent as to produce
quasi-citizens in the first place.
In Khosravi’s recollection, he demonstrates that he is a both a legal citizen of Sweden but
still qualifies as a quasi-citizen, demonstrating how an individual’s legal status does not entirely
determine where they are positioned on the spectrum of citizenship. While an anti-citizen may be
an unauthorized migrant, a quasi-citizen is a person who may, to varying degrees, enjoy the
benefits of citizenship or residency but remains, also to varying degrees, on the threshold of
inclusion and exclusion within a nation-state. A quasi-citizen could be a person with asylum
status, like Khosravi; a permanent resident; or a citizen naturalized by other means. Not only
does this demonstrate the long-lasting influence of the border gaze, but it also highlights the
intersectionality of membership: a person’s appearance, economic status, lifestyle, legal status,
native language, and other qualities are all factors that are both innately tied to migration and
border-crossing, and also distinguish a migrant and their relatives from the citizens who surround
them.
Therefore, it seems citizenship is not simply a binary, and perhaps not even a ternary, as
Khosravi’s concept of the anti-, quasi-, and full citizen demonstrate. The varying degrees to
which someone can adopt citizenship status reveals a spectrum-like quality to national
membership. That being said, if national membership is a gradient rather than a binary, the true
function of citizenship becomes obscured - it is no longer simply an instrument of distinguishing
the insider from the outsider, but an integral measure in the reproduction of sovereignty as it
serves as an indicator of an individual’s vulnerability to sovereign violence.

51
Citizenship, as the bearer of political life or “good life” in the modern nation-state, is the
acting polarizing force between sovereign violence and bare life. Citizenship obligates the
nation-state to a citizen’s bare life in a manner that is nearly contractual: so long as a person
retains citizen status, their bare life cannot be a target of sovereign violence. Even those regimes
considered the most atrocious and immoral have often shown adherence and respect for these
rules of membership; as Agamben noted, Jews in Nazi Germany could not be sent to death
camps without first being fully denationalized.82 Agamben’s example sheds a sinister light on
citizenship: the contractual quality it appears to possess in excluding a person from sovereign
violence is not actually guaranteed - it is only a construct that may be revoked by the sovereign
government at nearly any time. Agamben addresses the faithless nature of citizenship insofar as
it is a defense against state violence, asserting that the increasingly-omnipresent state of
exception casts even the full citizen into a condition of vulnerability. Meanwhile, both Khosravi
and De León contend that even when a nation-state is not in a declarative state of emergency,
those who remain on the threshold of inclusive exclusion of that nation likely exist in a
semi-permanent state of exception at all times. It is the state of exception that reveals what truly
endures: not citizenship itself, which may be withdrawn as the sovereign sees fit, but the
determinative quality of citizenship. Perhaps, then, the principal operation of citizenship is to
determine a person’s degree of exposure to sovereign necropower and violence. Citizenship can
then be viewed as a tool of positionality, set with the task of determining an individual’s locus not in relation to membership - but to death.
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Political Erasure and Exploitation
The degree to which an individual is vulnerable to sovereign violence is largely affixed to
their location on the spectrum of citizenry, as I will now discuss the necropolitical strategies of
the nation-state that target quasi-citizens and anti-citizens - thereby positioning them closer to
death. Again, it is important to note that necropower is not simply exercised through the killing
of an individual, but oftentimes through exposing them to conditions of violence, exploitation,
and subjugation - factors that are all likely to increase that individual’s chance of death. I will
also address how the national production of the homo sacer contributes to the widespread
political erasure of the migrant, and how, ultimately, this erasure is a crucial element to
sovereign self-legitimation.
“The gaze is not an innocent act of seeing, but an episteme determining who/what is
visible and invisible.”83 Here, Khosravi is defining a key aspect of “visibility” that the border
gaze is charged with commanding. Political visibility - the ability of certain groups to advocate
for their own interests through electoral politics, protest, lawmaking, or other means - is a luxury
afforded far more generously to “legal” citizens of a nation-state than to others. However, I
would like to briefly destabilize the binary of “visible” and “invisible” that Khosravi establishes,
if for no other reason than to address the fact that those communities who often have the least
political visibility are not actually invisible at all within the modern nation-state. The
highly-populated city tends to serve as many modern countries’ most compelling demonstration
of heterogeneity, representing perhaps that nation’s greatest intersection and interaction of class,
race, ethnicity, citizen status, gender, and sexual interaction. Of course, these cities are composed
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of different communities and neighborhoods that serve as class and cultural divides, particularly
owing to the de facto segregation that is rampant in many modern democracies in regards to
education, housing, and economic opportunity. However, it is highly unlikely that an individual
living even in the most homogenous enclave of such a city would live totally unexposed to
people of different backgrounds and communities. Thus, I am hesitant to designate migrant
communities “invisible” to the rest of the country as it would simply be untrue - while migrant
presence is dispersed disproportionately throughout most countries, the same can be said for
nearly every other demographic within most modern nation-states. Additionally, to label the
migrant community as “invisible” would be a dismissal of the perception of the people who live
in that community, many of whom are migrants or relatives of migrants and, thus, to whom
migrants are incredibly visible. To declare migrants “invisible” would be to overwrite their
narratives with the narratives of more privileged voices: likely, of those people who both enjoy a
large amount of political visibility and, owing to this, are ignorant of those who lack political
visibility. I believe the term “erasure” is more accurate in describing the condition that Khosravi
is articulating : the political disenfranchisement of a particular group contributing to the
widespread neglect of that group, despite their (possibly vast) presence within the nation-state.
The political erasure of the migrant is achieved through necropolitical means, taking
advantage of the migrant’s inclusive exclusion as a homo sacer in order to directly and indirectly
impose violence upon them. These measures can take on multiple different forms: some result
directly in an individual’s death; some exploit the labor-power of an individual for economic
gain; some immobilize an individual through detention. However, each of these measures share a
similar conclusion. The migrant is deprived of opportunities for political visibility and
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representation; thus, the migrant is a target of widespread political erasure. I do not mean to
designate migrants as non-agentic; to imply that would be an unacceptable dismissal of
individuality and empowerment that has been achieved by migrant communities in spite of the
social, economic, and cultural measures taken against them. Rather, what the erasure of migrants
and migrant communities enables is the nation-state’s improved ability to subordinate and
exploit the migrant for its own gain, while simultaneously ensuring the narrative surrounding
such exploitation and subordination remains within state control. As a result, full citizens of that
nation-state are likely to remain largely ignorant to the exploitation of migrant bodies while often
enjoying the benefits of that exploitation. Erasure is perhaps one of the most integral processes of
sovereign reproduction, both supplementing the Border Spectacle, as the perception of migrant
“invisibility” it facilitates for citizens contributes to the narrative of the border as a barrier, while
also narrowing the pathways for political empowerment and action - suppressing the migrant
voice even further.
De Genova discusses this process at length, focusing specifically on the exploitation of
migrant-labor power. He first addresses how the nation-state is able to control the narrative
surrounding migrant subordination through his concept of the Border Spectacle, which I have
already addressed. According to De Genova, practices of border securitization provide a
convincing spectacle that present national borders and border policy as maintaining the primary
goal of keeping migrants out of the interiority of the nation state. However, the scene of
exclusion set by this spectacle simultaneously distracts from and provides for the covert
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inclusion of the migrant - an inclusion that ultimately results in the subordination of their labor.84
De Genova explains the efficacy of this process, writing,
In spite of their apparent figuration as strictly politico-legal subjects, however, all
migrants – like all human life, generally – are finally apprehensible from the standpoint
of capital as always-already at least potentially the embodiment of labour-power, the
commodifiable human capacity for labour. Nevertheless, within the world social order of
capitalism, there is a systemic separation between the locus of exploitation and the means
of direct physical coercion, a separation in other words between the 'private' sector of the
market and the 'public' authority of law and the state. Capital's domination of labour
requires this bifurcation of social life under the effective hegemony of a relatively
durable distinction between the 'economic' and the 'political', whereby every state may be
best understood to be a particularization of the global political dimension of the
capital–labour relation.85
De Genova cites the state of exception with the “extra-economic” violence of border
policing. This kind of violence is manifest as employers are able to exploit migrant workers and
maximize profit, while denying them basic services such as healthcare, minimum wage, safe
working conditions, and more. Furthermore, the unauthorized migrants who disproportionately
occupy the most dangerous and low-paid jobs in countries such as the United States (such as
positions in the meatpacking industry) have few protections provided to them by the government.
The specter of “illegality” accompanies them even to the workplace, where speaking out against
labor violations risks deportation and thus makes reporting them more challenging.86 The Border
Spectacle, explains De Genova, is mainly a distraction, providing a scene of exclusion while
truly fostering the inclusion of migrants for the purpose of subordinating their labor. De Genova
states,
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Of course, this normalization [of migrant labor] occurs only after they have either
successfully navigated the militarized obstacle course of the Border Spectacle, or passed
quietly from a prior status of tentative or tenuous 'legality' to one of peremptorily
disenfranchised and almost instantaneously precarious 'illegality'. But for those who can
elude detection and evade apprehension and deportation, there awaits, as their thankless
reward, a protracted and indefinite social condition of deportability, and its attendant
deprivations, which will supply the distinctive qualification of their labour-power. The
exclusionary brashness of the Border Spectacle, then, is inextricable from its 'dirty secret',
its obscene underbelly – the real social relation of undocumented migrants to the state,
and the public secret of their abject inclusion as 'illegal' labour.87

De Genova here provides a compelling analysis of the exploitation of migrant
labor-power through border politics, concisely demonstrating the border rendering process in one
of its most powerful forms: the migrant, in crossing a border, does not enter into a zone that is
borderless, but opposingly, one in which the astonishing omnipresence of border politics and
policing remains and furthermore, allows the migrant to be exploited as labor-power. This form
of exploitation contributes to the reproduction of sovereignty in two different ways; both
isolating the migrant in exploitative conditions with little visibility to the public, and
simultaneously benefiting the economy as manufacturers can keep costs low for the American
consumer. Therefore, the migrant is both the subject of further erasure as well as a crucial source
of labor for the very industries that are essential to a national way of life.
However, I believe the subordination of migrant labor is not necessarily the overarching
objective of border politics, but only a single manifestation of national necropower exerted upon
the migrant. As De Genova qualifies, the migrant must first successfully cross a border before
being subject to the subordinate inclusion that allows for the exploitation of their labor in the first
place. Navigating a national border, particularly those that are highly securitized, provides a
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scene for the demonstration of necropower wherein migrants are exposed to violence in a
number of forms. De León demonstrates how U.S. border policy weaponizes a number of
actants, referred to as the hybrid collectif, t o facilitate violence and deaths of migrants who
attempt to cross the border through the Sonoran desert. The actants to which he refers include
natural elements, such as wild animals, climate, and desert terrain, as well as human elements,
such as smugglers, bandits, vigilantes, and border agents.88
Similarly, Reece Jones details both the direct and structural violence that surrounds some
of the world’s most deadly borders, including the Mediterranean EU border and the
Southwestern U.S. border. He argues, “...the existence of the border itself produces the violence
that surrounds it...the hardening of the border through new security practices is the source of the
violence, not a response to it.”89 The high death toll surrounding highly securitized borders is
directly linked to national border policy, particularly to those strategies that aim to “deter”
migrants from attempting to cross national borders. According to the research of Jones and De
León, deterrence strategies are unlikely to truly discourage migrants but instead force them to
undertake hazardous routes due to the securitization of the safest areas of entry. Despite the
existing evidence that such strategies are more deadly than discouraging, they are continuously
implemented as national-borders become more securitized. The peril of navigating a securitized
border, then, is not simply an obstacle arranged by the state to distract from the ultimate
objective of labor exploitation. I argue that border violence is another method of political erasure
that stands beside the subordinate inclusion of migrant labor. The violence at the national border
further contributes to the erasure of the migrant, particularly the unauthorized migrant, as the
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danger of border-crossing decreases the number of individuals who can actually manage to
surpass the border, while those who do must take certain measures to avoid deportation. As I
mentioned earlier, these measures can result in the exploitation of the migrant down the line,
such as in instances where employers commit labor violations with the knowledge that
unauthorized migrants are unlikely to report them due to their fear of deportation. Additionally,
migrants may be exploited in other ways, with fear of deportation deterring them from reporting
crimes such as sexual assault and domestic violence.90 The migrant’s increased likelihood of
encountering violence might be the most salient example of necropower operationalized. As the
state employs strategies that place the migrant’s life in peril, the migrant is likely to be forced
into isolated spaces as they attempt to avoid deportation, and their subsequent lack of visibility
likely confirms the convention that the nation-state is effectively fulfilling its purpose: keeping
the dangerous from entering the country through border securitization. For some, an
understanding of how violent border policy is also reaffirms this perception, as they hold the
belief that violence is a necessary measure to discourage migrants from attempting to cross the
border.
The immobilization of the migrant through detention is the third and final apparatus of
erasure I will mention. The migrant detention center is a powerful localization of inclusive
exclusion, existing perhaps more as a tangible representation of the state of exception than
anywhere else. Khosravi shares the experience of a Guinean man named Lamin, who spent over
ten years seeking asylum in various European countries and the United States before he was
deported back to Guinea from Sweden. Lacking the proper documentation, Lamin was returned
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to Sweden and spent the next two years in various detention centers and even prison - all without
having committed a crime. Khosravi writes,
The immigration detention centre...is a pre-modern prison – nothing more than a site for
the punishment and permanent removal of ‘wasted’ bodies. The removal system regulates
national ‘purity’ by confining and deporting undesirable non-citizens who are seen as
‘economically marginal and politically dangerous’ (Simon 1998:603). While prison is
associated with ‘disciplining’ and ‘normalization’ (Foucault 1977), detention is
associated with exposing undesirable non-citizens to abandonment or even death.91
The migrant detention center is a gripping testimony to the threshold of inclusion and exclusion
upon which migrants stand: in the detention center, the migrant is subject to the law insofar as
they are detained without having been charged with a crime for an indefinite amount of time.
Yet, the law is inaccessible to migrants - they are not criminals, so they have no right to due
process.92 Thus, the migrant is once again the target of erasure: detained indefinitely under the
law, but afforded no pathway to accessing that law. Migrants are subject to manifold danger in
detention centers as well - depending on the center, migrants may face restricted access to basic
needs such as toiletries, nutritional food, and medical care; sexual abuse by officers or fellow
detainees; and exposure to harsh climates.93 Furthermore, the migrant may be detained for weeks,
months, or even years, as was the case with Lamin - conclusively, a potent demonstration of the
migrant’s lack of protection against sovereign power. The immobilization of the migrant in
detention centers is yet another method of political erasure, operationalized by the nation-state in
order to force the migrant into spaces of isolation and subordination. In the detention center, the
migrant is the subject of the law, but to them the law is impervious - they are given little to no
opportunity to access the law, through due process or otherwise. Such a condition is another
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process of erasing the migrant from the public eye, while simultaneously supplementing the
specticality of the border.

Conclusion
The exploitation, violation, and immobilization of the migrant reduces their control over
their own narrative while simultaneously handing that control over to the state. On the threshold
of inclusion and exclusion, the migrant finds themselves at a disadvantage when attempting to
combat their own subordination, as their lack of true citizenship positions them always closer to
the necropower of the state. De Genova states,
The law remains effectively inaccessible and impervious to the would-be migrants who
might seek to appeal to it or challenge it. The onus of 'illegality' thus appears to rest
strictly and exclusively with those migrants who can be purported to have violated The
Law, as verifiable through the mundane practices of enforcement. In place of the social
and political relation of migrants to the state, therefore, the spectacle of border
enforcement yields up the thing-like fetish of migrant 'illegality' as a self-evident 'fact',
generated by its own supposed act of violation.94
As the migrant’s own narrative is silenced through the systemic erasure of their voice, the
nation-state is able to claim that narrative and reappropriate it - distorting the transnational
experience of the migrant to provide an account that ultimately serves the cyclical process of
sovereign production.
“Sovereign power produces migrants as excluded subjects to be dealt with violently while
simultaneously neutralizing their ability to resist or protest.”95 Here, De León illustrates the final
step in the production of national identity-making: the manner in which the migrant, reduced to
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bare life, is exposed to violence and concurrently delegitimized, ultimately fortifying national
sovereignty. “The inclusion of bare life in the political realm,” Agamben writes, “constitutes the
original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. ”96
The nation-state both requires and resists the migrant. The nationalized system of which
the nation-state is an institution necessitates a dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion, wherein
every person is included in one membership community and excluded by all others. The migrant
innately presents a challenge to this binary, occupying a state of inclusive exclusion: they are
subject to the sovereignty of the nation-state while simultaneously lacking membership to that
nation through citizenship. In this challenge, the migrant threatens to expose the very fabric of
the nation-state as constructed, destabilizing sovereign legitimacy through their own
transnationality. Yet, the nation-state is able to weaponize the migrant’s ambiguity - not only to
evade the threat of exposure, but to reproduce its own sovereignty. Instrumentalization of
discourse, imagery, and policy that portrays the migrant as a threat to national security and
prosperity creates a scene of exclusion, and citizens look to the increasing securitization as
evidence that the national border acts as a boundary against the impending threat of the migrant.
However, the physicality of the border is only a spectacle: the border, located nowhere but the
abstract intersection of sovereignty and statelessness, is not actually a boundary and is not
intended to function as one. Instead, the national border is a rendering process that strips the
migrant of their political life, reducing them to bare life and effectively producing a homo sacer.
The migrant, now an embodiment of sacred life, lacks the protection of citizenship and is thereby
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exposed to the forces of sovereign violence. Only able to occupy the space of the anti-citizen and
the quasi-citizen, the migrant as homo sacer reveals the manner in which citizenship determines
an individual’s locus to death - and migrants are always positioned closer to death than the full
citizen, always a target of the necropower employed by the sovereign nation-state. Through
necropolitical means, the migrant is exploited, violated, and subordinated to the point of political
erasure. It is only upon this erasure that the nation-state’s identity is realized and reproduced: the
migrant’s subordination and erasure is provided as evidence of the nation-state’s efficacy in
protecting its own citizens. Migrants, with little political recognition, are left with few pathways
to defend themselves from the sovereign violence of the nation-state. Citizens, captivated by the
spectacle of , believe the distorted narrative provided to them by the nation-state: migrant deaths
at the border are evidence of the border’s efficiency as a boundary; their internment in detention
centers as evidence of the successful containment of an imminent threat; their exploitation in the
workplace and its economic benefits as an economy unfettered by the danger migrants pose to
national prosperity. Agamben determines,
The life caught in the sovereign ban is the life that is originarily sacred - that is, that may
be killed but not sacrificed - and in this sense, the production of bare life is the originary
activity of sovereignty. The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely
fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely
both life’s subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation
of abandonment.97
Thus, it is the necropolitical subordination of the migrant upon which sovereignty is
constructed over and over again; the migrant, in their statelessness, is integral to the production
of national legitimacy, but at the same time poses perhaps the greatest risk to sovereignty. Only
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upon the migrant’s exposure to death is the citizen’s identity reaffirmed and - finally - has the
nation-state once more realized its never-ending quest for sovereign legitimacy. Mbembe
describes the nature of the migrant and citizen identity:
The perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat
or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life
and security—this, I suggest, is one of the many imaginaries of sovereignty characteristic
of both early and late modernity itself...They also challenge the idea that, of necessity, the
calculus of life passes through the death of the Other; or that sovereignty consists of the
will and the capacity to kill in order to live.98
Mbembe demonstrates here what is nothing less than the indelible mark of death upon
sovereignty. The national production of violence is a ceaseless political performance of which
migrants are forced to play a part, and thus, the nation-state proves itself to be faithless to all but
its own sovereignty. In the following section, I will present an empirical account of this very
process in place at the Southwestern United States border, and I aim only to demonstrate the
material consequences of nationalization upon those who resist it.
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Chapter 3: The United States
The Innate Brutality of American Sovereignty
In this final chapter, I will use a single case to provide an empirical demonstration of the
concepts that I have discussed in the previous chapters. The national border that I find best
exemplifies these concepts is the Southwestern border that separates the United States from
Mexico, and I aim to convey the brutality of sovereign reproduction through an examination of
American policy and the dynamics that have accompanied their implementation. In doing so, I
intend to establish the border-rendering process, sacred life, and national legitimation as more
than abstract theoretical concepts, but rather as material dynamics with immensely violent
consequences for those who resist national narratives.
I will build from David Campbell’s conception of dynamic statehood to illustrate that
nation-states are not static entities, but beings whose construction can never be fully realized;
national identity, and the sovereignty that requires it, are always at odds with the constructed and
performative nature innately embedded in nationhood - a nature which can never be revealed.99
According to Campbell, “No state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity, and no state is free
from the tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for a political community
to come into being, an alignment that is a response to, rather than constitutive of, a prior and
stable identity.”100 The tensions that Campbell describes are perhaps most salient along the
dynamics facilitated by the U.S.-Mexico border, where those who intend to cross are caught on
the threshold of inclusion and exclusion; life and death; belonging and statelessness. Ultimately,
the Mexican and Central American migrants who attempt to cross the U.S.-Mexico border
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represent both a fundamental threat to the logic of statehood, as well as an optimal weapon that
the United States may wield in order to momentarily neutralize the relentless tension between
sovereignty and identity. In this chapter, I will begin with a brief contextualization of Mexican
and Central American patterns of migration into the United States, and the subsequent
production of identity-based discourses of danger intended to otherize Latin American migrants
within American communities. I will then use American policy and its reverberations to exhibit
how the nation-state purposefully reduces the migrant to a homo sacer, and how, through the
imposition of direct and structural violence, migrants are effectively subordinated and subject to
widespread political erasure. Finally, I aim to illuminate how this subordination and erasure is
exploited by the United States, which weaponizes the migrant’s condition of sacred life in order
to forge - over and over again - its own identity in the eyes of its citizens and thus, fortify its
legitimacy as a sovereign body.
Production of Migrant Danger
Background
Like any other transnational pattern of movement, the presence of Latin American
migrants in the United States has been fostered by worldwide processes that may be traced back
centuries, perhaps even millenia. While I can not provide an entire history of these processes of
global colonization, hierarchy, and identity, I do wish to briefly emphasize the long and
destructive history of U.S. involvement in Latin America in order to provide a cohesive backdrop
for my analysis. There are several sociopolitical dynamics that are most frequently attributed to
the movement of Mexican and Central Americans into the United States, which include gang
violence, drug trade, economic strife, and lack of protection by the government. I believe that
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examining the American influence in current Central American and Mexican political dynamics
is important not only as it provides an integral element to my own analysis of borders and
sovereignty, but as it additionally acknowledges the role of the United States in fostering the
current conditions in Central America and Mexico - a role which the United States government
has repeatedly refused accountability for, and about which has failed to educate its citizens.
There are three elements operationalized by the United States that I will highlight in what
follows: Cold War dynamics, crime policy, and economic neoliberalism. In discussing each
theme, I intend to illustrate the manner in which the United States has facilitated the very
conditions that define Central American and Mexican migration past the U.S.-Mexico border
today.
While the purpose of U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1980s has been
debated by scholars, many have come to agree that the defining foreign policy of the time is
undeniably linked to American Cold War interests. At the time, the Reagan administration
rationalized U.S. involvement in the region by citing security concerns as the principal
motivation, despite the observed lack of a salient security threat at the time.101 Continuing an
American legacy of anti-Communist sentiment, the Reagan administration’s policy objectives
included the crushing of insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala, and expected cooperation
from other countries in the region such as Honduras and Costa Rica in achieving this goals.102
These insurgencies were left-wing responses to economic and civil disparities, led largely by
indigenous peoples and peasants against the military-controlled governments of each nation.
Acting upon right-wing ideological and economic interests, the United States combatted these
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insurgencies through the funding, training, and public support of numerous brutal
administrations and counterinsurgency efforts: upon the 1982 presidential installation of former
general Efraín Ríos Montt, Reagan renewed economic aid to Guatemala, lauding the
government’s apparent defense of the country against the threat of Communism. In response, the
Ríos Montt administration acted swiftly and brutally, destroying an estimated 686 indigenous
villages - resulting in the deaths of some 50,000 to 75,000 people.103 In El Salvador, the Reagan
administration continued to provide military aid in amounts escalating from $5.7 million in 1980
to $110.3 million in 1984, with Reagan having used emergency powers to appropriate the final
$32 million following refusal of congressional consent for the funds.104 This funding was in spite
of the fact that nearly 40,000 people, many of them unarmed civilians, had been murdered by the
armed forces between 1979 and 1984 - a defining feature of these civil wars were U.S.-trained
death squads, which terrorized civilians and razed indigenous villages in order to quell
resistance.105
A final crucial note on United States Cold War policy in Central America is the
widespread ambiguity, convolution, and outright denial of U.S. involvement and action in the
region. Wrongfully citing security concerns as the motivation behind U.S. intervention was not
the only oversight of the Reagan administration. The administration also plainly denied or
diminished the human rights abuses that occurred in El Salvador and Guatemala in order to
continue providing military aid to the counterinsurgencies.106 Furthermore, of the refugees
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produced by these civil wars - 1 million from Guatemala; over 500,000 from El Salvador - only a
mere three percent of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum cases were approved. The denial of
human rights violations in both countries led the administration to classify asylum seekers
simply as “economic migrants,” and continue to pour aid into the military regimes in El Salvador
and Guatemala.107
Many of the migrants that fled the turbulence and brutality of the civil wars found
themselves in Los Angeles in the 1990s, and their children began to form small gangs or
conform to already existing ones as a result of their lack of opportunity in American
communities.108 As street gang-related violence increased and became a recognized issue in
Southern California, U.S. officials introduced the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act. The 1996 act signified an expansion of the “get-tough” approach
to immigration law, greatly expanding the offenses for which a person could be deported or
stripped of their citizenship. As a result, the number of deportees to Central America rose into
the thousands for the remaining years of the 1990s.109
Though security concerns may actually have motivated the Clinton administration’s
hard-line approach to the growing issue of street gangs, Congress proceeded with little
consideration or care for the wellbeing of three countries that, only a decade before, had suffered
major social, economic, and political upheaval - much of which was facilitated by U.S. funding
of brutal counterinsurgency measures. As a result, the spike in U.S. deportees to Central America
supercharged gangs such as MS-13, and disseminated gang presence throughout Central America
and Mexico.
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Additionally, the tough-on-crime policies implemented in U.S. cities like New York110
during the early 2000s influenced some Central American regimes to espouse mano dura (strong
hand) policies - characterized by strict measures such as the pursuit and detainment of youths
simply on the suspicion of gang involvement without evidence or due process. Such policies
were “encouraged by U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement
Agency, which were working with Central American governments to control crime.”111 With the
crackdown and mass incarceration of gang members, gang leaders were now able to meet and
organize criminal activities - thus, contributing the centralization and strengthening of
ultraviolent gangs like MS-13 and M-18.
Finally, American economic neoliberalism is also a driving force behind the conditions
that have mobilized migration into the U.S. from Central America and Mexico. Measures such as
CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic - Central America Free Trade Agreement) and NAFTA
(North American Free Trade Agreement) have both been accused of restructuring the region’s
economy to guarantee dependence on the United States through the influx of American goods
and immense trade imbalances that weaken domestic industries.112113 The economic strife and
displacement in the region contributed both to the rapid urbanization that strengthened the gangs,
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Discourses of Danger
Having provided a brief overview of the conditions that foster Central American and
Mexican migration to the United States, I now must address the discourse that has been produced
alongside the growing Latin American presence in the U.S.. To reiterate what I discussed in the
first chapter, the state requires discourses of danger in order to promote a social space of “us”
and “them” (citizen and foreigner; outsider and insider) and portray the migrant as a threat to
national security and prosperity. Campbell writes, “The ability to represent things as alien,
subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American
experience.”115 According to Campbell, even the simple existence of an alternative identity, one
which exemplifies that different identities are possible and legitimate, denaturalizes the claim of
one identity as being the “true” identity and might be enough to produce the perception of a
threat.116 He continues, “For both insurance and international relations, therefore, danger results
from the calculation of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an
ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk.”117 The promotion of the “us” and “them”
social space exceeds geography - it also results in a perceived moral divergence between the
citizen and the foreigner.118
Upon this perception of contrasting morality, the discourse of danger surrounding Latin
American migrants in the United States is grounded. This discourse is characterized by rhetoric
that paints the migrant as a threat, enforcing and reinforcing assumptions that Latin American
migrants are engaged in drug trafficking, gang violence, tax evasion, and other forms of violent
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and nonviolent crime. While the notion persists that the particularly explicit racialized discourse
against migrants is mainly the province of the uneducated, many well-known academics have
also contributed to this discourse - at times in a highly forceful manner, as is the case with
Samuel Huntington’s 2004 article “The Hispanic Challenge.” In this article, Huntington laments
the way in which high numbers of Latin American migrants contribute to the degradation of
American society, proclaiming that Mexican Americans must “think of themselves as members
of a small minority who must accommodate the dominant group and adopt its culture.”119 He
concludes his testimony to the persistence of “Anglo-White” culture with this particularly bold
message: “There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an
Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if
they dream in English.”120 Huntington’s perception of “hispanic” migrants as detrimental to
American society exemplifies the notion of moral superiority fostered by discourses of danger.
His sentiments are not an anomaly either. Rather, they are reinforced, however subtly, by forces
as persuasive as the american government.
Administrations from both sides of the political spectrum are responsible for perpetuating
these myths, and in doing so not only reinforce misunderstandings of migrants held by their
constituents, but also allow for policy building to exacerbate these misunderstandings. In 1995,
Bill Clinton promised in his State of the Union speech to “end the abuse” of American
immigration laws and crack down on “illegal aliens” allegedly burdening the economy.121 Ten
years later, George W. Bush said in his own State of the Union speech that new immigration
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policy was necessary that would “close the borders to drug dealers and terrorists.”122 During his
State of the Union address on February 12, 2013, President Barack Obama argued for heightened
security as a way to slow undocumented migration flows: ‘Real reform means strong border
security, and we can build on the progress my administration has already made— putting more
boots on the southern border than at any time in our history and reducing illegal crossings to
their lowest levels in 40 years.’”123 His 2014 Immigration Accountability Executive Action,
though largely recognized as a progressive reformation of American immigration policy,
encouraged increased securitization at the border and touted the importance of “cracking down”
on migrants with criminal records.124 Since his campaign in 2016, Donald Trump presidency has
been largely defined by his engaging in controversial rhetoric about migrants, including the
claim that many Mexican migrants are bringing drugs, crime, and rape to the United States.125
Each of these key moments in U.S. immigration policy represent the use of a conception
that has been widespread in American political discourse. This conception, which justifies the
consistent increase in border securitization and criminalization of unauthorized immigration,
presents the migrant as an inherent danger to American security and prosperity. In recent
decades, it is the Latin American migrant who finds themself perhaps the largest target for this
discourse, making up the vast majority of migrants into American territory, and therefore is
frequently framed as inherent to American safety and security.
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However, the belief that the majority of Latin American migrants are engaged in criminal
activity, whether it be drug trade, gang activity, or other forms of violent crime - and that the
Southwestern border is a pipeline for these crimes - has also been disproven on a number of
occasions. Studies have consistently found that migrants commit crimes at a much lower rate
than citizens born in the U.S., and that there is a negative correlation between levels of
immigration and crime rates.126 The Cato Institute also concluded that unauthorized migrants are
less likely to be incarcerated than birthright citizens.127 The DEA has confirmed that most drug
trafficking occurs at ports of entry into the United States, rather than between them.128
Though threats to economic anxiety may seem more benign in comparison to those
towards public safety, the impact of Latin American migrants on U.S. prosperity is a large source
of anxiety for many American citizens. Still, the widely kept notion that migrants cost the United
States billions of dollars each year was disputed by a bipartisan analysis published by the
National Academy of Sciences in 2017, which determined that the average immigrant makes a
net positive fiscal contribution of $259,000 in net present value across the federal, state, and
local levels of government.129 The assumption that migrants are largely responsible for welfare
consumption was also swiftly discredited by the Cato Institute, whose studies found that adult
immigrants are 47% less likely to receive social security benefits and 27% less likely to receive
benefits based on age or income status than citizens born in the U.S.130 Finally, the claim that
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migrants do not pay taxes also has little ground in reality: the ADL reports that immigrants
collectively pay between $90 and $140 billion each year in taxes, and that undocumented
immigrants alone pay approximately $11.64 billion in taxes each year.
The marked dissonance between the conventional discourse regarding Latin American
migrants and the migrants themselves highlight the fact that such discourse, no matter how
misinformative, may be serving a more clandestine function. Discourses of danger, I have
argued, lay the ground for brutal border policy that allows the nation-state to effectively carry out
sovereign violence upon the migrant. As this process is operationalized, however, such discourse
is serving two other functions that are closely intertwined: the production of American identity
both as state, and as a specific kind of state. Primarily, the distinction of insider from outsider is
essential to the construction of any nation-state, and in mobilizing discourses that embolden this
distinction, the United States has effectively reaffirmed its own status as a nation-state. This
reaffirmation is in accordance with the process of national formation in Chapter 1, as any
nation-state must form itself against the identity of a constructed “other.” However, the United
States is also engaging in identity production in a far more specific manner, constructing itself as
a unique entity within the nationalized system - in a sense, defining what kind of state it is
among all other states. In this process, the U.S. is wielding discursive power as a way of
promoting a certain image of America: a nation-state which is defined by hardworking, moral,
and self-made individuals and in turn must be securitized against people occupying a contrasting
moral space. In this case, migrants are painted as those individuals; the discursive tactics which
portray them as lazy, opportunistic, and uncivilized signify their innate incohesion with what is
perceived to be American society. This process once again demonstrates, in a magnified and
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more detailed way, how identity is constructed against the “other.” If migrants embody specific
traits that are so incongruent with American society that security measures must be taken against
them, American society must be the opposite.
In what follows, I will demonstrate, through a number of policies passed by multiple
American administrations, how the United States has produced a legacy of criminalization,
exploitation, and subordination targeted towards those who wish to cross the border.

Necropolitical Policy
In 1994, with Latin American migrants now providing the majority of immigration into
the United States, Border Patrol enacted the strategy known as “Prevention Through Deterrence”
(PTD) with the purpose of deterring the attempts of migrants to permeate the Southwestern
border.131 Soon after, the 1996 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) transformed immigration policy in the U.S., expanding crimes for which one could be
deported to include minor offenses.132 Both PTD and IIRIRA were enacted under the
administration of Bill Clinton. During the George W. Bush administration, Bush oversaw the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security and brought criminal prosecutions of
unauthorized migrants to full force under the initiative Operation Streamline.133 While Barack
Obama’s presidency adopted a more progressive immigration platform, his administration
facilitated a number of harmful policies, including the expansion of a law that allowed for police
officers to turn over suspects and criminals to immigration authorities in order to authorize their
deportation - a policy that was widely criticized for racial profiling and the violation of numerous
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civil rights.134 In later years, In 2018, the Trump administration’s DHS enacted a
“zero-tolerance” policy wherein every person caught crossing the border without authorization is
to be referred for federal prosecution, whether or not they have valid asylum claims or are first
time offenders.135
I aim to provide far more detail about each of these policies in what follows, though I will
not discuss them according to the chronological framework I have just provided. I will instead
examine each according to their contributions to the border-rendering process, and subsequently
how they permit the Latin American migrant’s exposure to sovereign violence.
Violence
What first must be addressed is the term “violence.” Colloquially, the term “violence” is
likely to signify direct action imposed upon someone with the intention of causing physical
harm. A more broad understanding of violence is provided by the World Health Organization as:
“The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another
person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of
resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.” This definition
is perhaps more reminiscent of the model of direct versus structural violence, where “direct
violence” is characterized by action that directly and immediately or (near-immediately) results
in a person’s physical harm or death, while “structural violence” refers to widespread, gradual
action that results in the deaths of many by depriving them access to basic necessities. An
example of direct violence would be an instance of sexual assault, whereas an example of
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structural violence might be the deprivation of affordable healthcare to an entire population.
Many also include “cultural violence” as a third categorization, wherein cultural aspects of a
specific population are used to justify the imposition of structural (perhaps even direct) violence
directly upon that population; an example of this would be institutionalized racism. Other
thinkers dissect the branches of violence even further, designating specific areas of “violence” to
harm against the environment, the limitation of access to land, economic violence, and other
factors.136
Evidently, the study and categorization is extremely nuanced and may be expressed in a
number of different ways according to different schools of thought. I do not wish to establish my
own categorization of violence, but simply ensure that the concept of “violence” may be
understood to encompass not only instances of direct violence, but other indirect and long-lasting
forms of violence as well (that might be classified as structural any other subgroup.) Sovereign
violence as it manifests within the nation-state is not limited to the shooting of a gun, but to
conditions that exist for the purpose of subordination, exploitation, and detention. For the
purposes of this paper, I will demonstrate the necropolitical nature of American border policy
first through policy as it reduces the migrant to a homo sacer by means of criminalization. Next,
I will discuss direct violence imposed upon migrants by both state and non-state actors - with the
understanding that the nation-state is largely responsible for this violence in totality due to the
conditions fostered by border policy. I will then expand my scope to analyzing the structural
violence enacted through necropolitical policy through the respective detention, exploitation, and
erasure of the migrant.
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Illegalization
For many Americans, this person—whose remains are so ravaged that his or her sex is
unknown—is (was) an “illegal,” a noncitizen who broke U.S. law and faced the
consequences. Many of these same people tell themselves that if they can keep calling
them “illegals,” they can avoid speaking their names or imagining their faces.
Jason De León, The Land of Open Graves
In order to achieve a comprehensive outlook on the sovereign violence imposed upon
migrants, it is imperative to consider the role criminalization policies have played in sanctioning
violence against migrants. It wasn’t until 1929 that the act of crossing the border without
authorization became criminalized, following Section 1325 in Title 8 of the U.S. Code. This law
went largely unenforced for the majority of the twentieth century, and the vast majority of
unauthorized border-crossers were not brought up on criminal charges.137 With the Clinton
administration’s introduction of the IIRIRA, the scope of who could be deported was greatly
broadened.. Additionally, the crimes for which one could be deported were extended to include
minor offenses such as drunk driving and petty theft, or even minor drug offenses and speeding.
Even foreign-born citizens became at risk for deportation, now able to be stripped of their
citizenship and deported after serving their prison terms.138
Following the events of 9/11 and the heightened fear of terrorism, President George W.
Bush introduced a number of policies aimed at securitization, including the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2005, the Bush administration brought criminal
prosecutions of unauthorized migrants to full force with the introduction of Operation
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Streamline: an initiative of the DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) with the intention of
combatting weapon and drug trafficking, human smuggling, and repeat instances of unauthorized
entry into the United States.139 The stated goal of this initiative was to achieve total
criminalization of unauthorized border crossing into the United States.140 Initially, migrants were
charged with misdemeanors for their first attempt to cross the border; felonies for their second
attempt; and then faced formal deportation. The impact of this policy was evident: there were
rarely more than 20,000 deportations every year before the mid-1980s, and by the mid 2000s that
number had escalated to 400,000 per year.141 With the Obama and Trump administrations
following in the legacy of Operation Streamline, immigration offenses now make up the majority
of criminal prosecutions in the U.S..142 The border became more securitized with the increase in
funding and hiring of Border Patrol, and according to Jones, “In the past, most migrants detained
at the border were quickly processed and voluntarily repatriated to Mexico, often within a few
hours of being caught...an acknowledgement that the vast majority of migrants at the border were
poor workers, not smugglers or criminals.”143 In fact, the securitization of the border and increase
in deporations has only bolstered human smuggling - when an unauthorized migrant is deported,
they are likely to attempt to cross the border again in a few days, producing more clients for
human smugglers. Owing to a recent policy, Central American deportees who were denied
asylum in the United States are dropped off on the Mexican side of the border and almost
guaranteed to be kidnapped - they are easily discernible as deportees to highly-organized

Joanna Lydgate, “Assembly Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline,” The Chief Justice Earl Warren
Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity ( January 2010).
140
Ibid.
141
Jones, Violent Borders, 36.
142
Del Valle, “The Dark, Racist History of Section 1325 of U.S. Immigration Law.”.
143
Jones, Violent Borders, 36.
139

80
networks who kidnap migrants and hold them for ransom, demanding thousands of dollars from
their relatives in return for their safe release.144 The fostering of human smuggling is not specific
to the United States, either: Khosravi highlights that similar dynamics have unfolded at borders
across the world including Malaysia, South Africa, and Iran.145
Following the introduction of Operation Streamline, migrants have been subjected to
criminalization for attempting to cross the border. Operation Streamline has been the subject of
intense scrutiny, especially regarding its introduction of bundling and rapid processing cases:
under this operation, cases are often not heard individually but in large groups that can amount to
up to 70 cases in one hearing; individuals are often shackled and herded into courtrooms, with
officials taking as little as 30 seconds to review each case.146 Critics note that this is a violation of
due process, and many individuals who are United States citizens or have legitimate claims to
asylum do not have an opportunity to present their cases. The infringement on due process that
occurs in these courtrooms is only one example of how criminalization policy allows the United
States to subordinate migrants, however. Agamben’s notion of state of exception is noted by
Jason De León to be an important concept when it comes to the function American borders. He
refers to border zones as “spaces of exception - physical and political locations where an
individual’s rights and protections under law can be stripped away upon entrance.”147 As the fear
of terrorism following the events of 9/11 gave way to Operation Streamline, the fear of Latin
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American migrants and their impact on American security and prosperity have allowed for the
continuation of unjust, violent practices at the Southwestern Border.
Plainly, the illegalization of border-crossing is not organic but constructed. The burden of
illegality is central to American border policy: it is a strategic production harnessed in order to
legitimize the sovereign violence enacted upon outsiders who intend to move inwards. The issue
of migration into the United States, in its redefinition from a social condition to a crime, permits
the production of criminals insofar as it reconfigures the violence imposed upon them as
“punishment” - ultimately implying that the migrant has done something to warrant their
exposure to violence. Furthermore, the production of illegality strengthens the Border Spectacle,
De Genova writes, “In place of the social and political relation of migrants to the state, therefore,
the spectacle of border enforcement yields up the thing-like fetish of migrant 'illegality' as a
self-evident 'fact', generated by its own supposed act of violation.”148 Once again, the power of
identities that have been forged against one another is demonstrated, as it provides a “norm” of
illegality to be prescribed to migrants in contrast to the lawful citizen.149 In this, the contrasting
spaces of morality are constituted and upheld, and migrants experience further differentiation
and alienation as perceived bearers of “illegality.”
Agamben derives his concept of sacred life from an ancient Roman principle, wherein a
criminal was subject to the revocation of his citizenship. He all at once existed both within the
law and without it: rendered homo sacer following his violation of the law, and owing to the
onus of illegality he now bore, was placed by the law beyond the law. As the law stripped him of
his citizenship, his life - and death - were beyond the scope of law. The homo sacer is one who
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can be violated or killed with impunity, for their criminality has placed them outside of the
sphere of law. This is how the production of illegality operates: it redefines border-crossing as a
crime and thus burdens the migrant with illegality. The migrant, reduced to bare life and
rendered a homo sacer, is now subject to a spectrum of violence that is legitimized by their
condition and ultimately perpetuated, directly or indirectly, by the state.

Deterrence
The most salient pattern of sovereign violence carried out against migrants in the United
States is likely direct violence perpetrated by state actors. The perpetrators to which I refer as
“state actors” are those who work in an institution of the American government. This can include
police officers, members of the military, and those upon whom I will mainly focus my attention
here: agents of the Department of Homeland security, including agents of Customs and Border
Patrol and ICE. Operation Streamline and the accompanying policy enacted by the Bush
administration following 9/11 saw an immense increase in heightened border securitization of
the mid-2000s, resulting in a hiring surge that almost doubled the force’s size in the years
following 9/11. With that increase came an increase in complaints of excessive force.150 As the
U.S. government came to prioritize border security, the standards for who could qualify to be a
Border Patrol agent were lowered, resulting in the employment of people who were untrained,
unqualified, or had violent records.151152 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is
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responsible for almost half a million arrests per year, as well as a correspondingly high use of
force, with CBP reporting nearly 1,000 uses of force in 2017 alone. These instances range from
fatal shootings to “less-lethal force,” an umbrella term for physical assault, dog attacks, pepper
spray, stun guns, and batons. One famous case of death inflicted by Border Patrol is that of
fifteen-year-old Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, who was allegedly throwing rocks at border
agent Jesus Mesa Jr as he forcibly apprehended a friend of Hernández Güereca. Mesa Jr. shot
and killed Hernández Güereca, despite the fact that Hernández Güereca was at least 20 to 30
meters away from his assailant and on the opposite side of the border when he was shot.153
Despite video evidence of the incident, Mesa Jr. was not indicted for the murder. Furthermore,
the supreme court ruled on February 25, 2020 that the parents of Hernández could not sue Mesa
Jr. for his use of excessive force against their teenage son, citing that no legal action taken could
be taken owing to the “cross-border” nature of the shooting. Other shootings that have been ruled
in favor of the defendant agents include the 2010 murder of 18-year-old Juan Mendez, an
unarmed citizen was shot in the back from a distance while running from an agent in Texas;
unarmed 19-year-old citizen Carlos Lamadrid, who was shot in the back as he climbed a border
fence in Arizona in 2011; and unarmed 20-year-old Gerardo Lozano Rico, who was shot in
Texas in a fleeing car in 2011.154 It is also important to keep in mind that these numbers for CBP
use of force are self-reported, and they also don’t account for the dozens of instances of sexual
assault by CBP reported every year.155
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The direct violence perpetrated by state actors at the border, and the manner in which
American securitization policy exacerbated the issue immensely, only demonstrates one aspect
of sovereign violence and does not even account for the majority of death at the U.S.-Mexico
border. In fact, it is the violence imposed upon migrants by non-state actors - including
environmental factors and civilians - that most significantly constitutes the apparatus of death at
work in the Southwestern borderlands. Here, the distinction between direct and structural
violence will be blurred, due in large part to the dynamics of violence as it manifests through
non-human and non-state actors. However, my point remains the same: that United States border
policy is responsible for the production of violence at the Southwestern border. One policy in
particular, known as Prevention Through Deterrence (PTD), produced a bloody legacy that has
defined the U.S.-Mexico border as one of the deadliest in the world. PTD is a strategy that was
implemented by Border Patrol in 1993 in an attempt to address high numbers of unauthorized
border entry and wide public scrutiny regarding current border policy. Prior to 1993, the standard
procedure for agents was to attempt to apprehend migrants after they had crossed into the United
States.156 PTD was introduced as a strategy intended to address the problem directly at the border
by securitizing areas with high instances of unauthorized entry. With sub-operations like
Operation Blockade in San Diego and Operation Hold-The-Line in El Paso, urban points of entry
into the U.S. were sealed off by fences, barbed wire, additional agents, response teams, cameras,
and other technology.157 As a result of this, migrants are funneled through desert and wilderness
in an attempt to reach the U.S. border. While migrants who attempt this journey are still at risk of
experiencing violence at the hands of a Border Patrol agent, they face a myriad of other
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challenges that condemn them to almost certain death or trauma.158 Migrants attempting the
journey through the Sonoran desert, for instance, are likely to encounter harm and death in a
variety of other ways: injury, dehydration, hypothermia, heat stroke, exhaustion, wild animals,
infection, bandits, human smugglers, and sexual and physical abuse are regular challenges that
migrants face during their journey to the border.159
It is easy to dismiss this kind of danger as a “natural” part of undertaking a journey
throughs such a landscape. However, the hardship migrants experience on the way to the border
is a form of violence sanctioned by American border policy; though indirect, it is just as much a
result of border strategy and law as deaths directly perpetuated by border agents or in migrant
holding facilities. The deterrence model has been widely scrutinized in Jason DeLeón’s Land of
Open Graves, where he claims that PTD is merely a strategy conjured by Border Patrol in order
to “draw on the agency of animals and other nonhumans to do its dirty work while
simultaneously absolving itself of any blame connected to migrant injuries or loss of life.”160 De
León highlights that while PTD has had little impact on the numbers of people attempting to
cross the border, it has resulted in an upsurge of fatalities as people try and fail to make the
journey.161 While Border Patrol estimates 6,000 have died since the 1990s, other estimates are far
higher.162 And, as De León explained in depth, many bodies are never recovered, so precision is
impossible.
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In regards to PTD, De León adds, “...the Border Patrol has intentionally set the stage so
that other actants can do most of the brutal work...I see this environment as the perfect silent
partner in boundary control.”163 He also notes that the architects of this strategy, as well as others
who enforced it in later years, were aware of its lethality, justifying the deaths as the cost of
protecting the nation: for example, he cites a 1997 account from the Government Accountability
office that identifies “deaths of aliens attempting entry” as one of the “indicators for measuring
the effectiveness of the strategy to deter alien entry.”164 Truthfully, Prevention Through
Deterrence did not, in fact, deter migrants, but created a space which isolated migrants from the
public eye, funneling them away from urban areas of entry and forcing them to instead attempt to
undertake dangerous pathways characterized by perilous terrain, extreme climate, and
inconceivable violence. PTD is perhaps the most salient example of the state of exception, which
is largely a political condition, materializing as geographic. The terrain surrounding the
U.S.-Mexico border was transformed effectively into a deathscape where a migrant becomes a
homo sacer owing to their intent to cross a border and may thus be killed with impunity - by wild
animals, climate conditions, bandits, or agents. The actor that perhaps best exemplifies the
unpunishability of migrant death, however, is the vigilante. Jason De León recounts his horror at
the presence of cazamigrantes within the Southwestern borderlands - translated to
“migrant-hunters,” cazamigrantes - in recent years, a number of border crossers have reported
white men, dressed in camouflage, shooting at them in the desert.165 Quite literally, the
Southwestern borderlands have become a space in which civilians may attempt to kill migrants
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for sport, understanding that the isolated landscape and unforgiving environment signifies the
impunity of their actions.

Zero-Tolerance
The use of “deterrence” as a strategy of justification for lethal policy brings me to a third
condition of violence: detention. As PTD rendered the migrant a homo sacer, the criminalization
of border-crossing produced by strategies like Operation Streamline allowed the migrant’s sacred
life to extend beyond the borderlands and well into the nation, providing the framework for the
policies of detention that characterized both the Obama and Trump administrations. Obama’s
presidency has been perceived as taking a progressive approach to immigration reform compared
to his predecessor, attempting to direct the scope of deportation to “criminals” as opposed to
children, families, and those who had not committed any crimes. However, the Obama
administration oversaw the deporting of 3 million - an estimated 1.7 of whom had no criminal
record. These mass deportations were largely due to the administration’s expansion of
enforcement, an effort which supporters of the administration argue was a way to appeal to the
conservatives who opposed progressive migration reform. Regardless of intent, the internal
enforcement of the Obama administration did not only result in mass deportations but a shift
from “returns” to “removals.”166 “Returns,” which were used during the first term of the Bush
administration, signified the deportation of a migrant in such a way that their fingerprints were
not taken and their immigration records were unmarked. At the tail end of the Bush
administration, the DHS shifted instead to formal “removals,” a process which created a
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permanent record - an action which meant that those who were attempting to cross again risked
jail time and were prohibited from applying for legal status for at least five years. The Obama
administration embraced removals more forcefully, as formal removal charges were filed in
cases up almost 30% from Bush’s final year. Under the Obama administration, the scope of
criminality was broadened to apply to at least 90% of cases, contributing to a foundation upon
which Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, could exacerbate the violent effects of American
migration policy.
Under the Trump administration in 2018, the DHS enacted what is commonly known as
the “zero-tolerance” policy. While some aspects of the policy, such as family separation, are
largely attributable to the Trump administration, other features, such as the detainment of
migrants in prison-like facilities, preceded Donald Trump’s inauguration and have simply been
exacerbated by zero-tolerance. However, what makes zero-tolerance a compelling example of
necropower is the further criminalization of migrants, building from the enforcement reforms of
the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, and the human rights violations that accompany
it. Under the zero-tolerance strategy, every person caught crossing the border without
authorization is to be referred to federal prosecution, whether or not they have valid asylum
claims or are first time offenders.167 Detention was once restricted to those who posed a definite
risk to public safety; under zero-tolerance, asylum seekers, first-time offenders, and all others
apprehended at the border are detained in facilities in what is called “civil detention.” They are
not serving time for a crime, but waiting for a hearing to determine whether they may legally

Tal Kopan, “New DHS policy could separate families caught crossing the border illegally,” CNN Politics, 7 May
2018.
167

89
remain in the country. Their detention is justified as being intended to ensure that people show
up for the hearings.168
Though President Trump reversed the feature of family separation after intense political
pressure, he instructed the DOJ to overturn the Flores Agreement169 so that children, and families
with children, can be held indefinitely in U.S. Immigrantion and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
facilities.170 In detention centers, migrants wait an average of more than four weeks to be
released, though it is reported that some are held for years and even decades. Thousands of
detainees have reported sexual and physical abuse inside the facilities.171 The environment of
many of the centers has been characterized as inhumane, with migrants (including children)
facing conditions including but not limited to: poor nutrition; limited or no access to showers,
baths, or toothbrushes and toothpaste; extreme overcrowding; limited or no access to neccessary
medications; freezing temperatures; exposure to the elements; physical abuse; sexual abuse; and
limited or no access to legal counsel.172 At least six children died in holding facilities in 2019,173
and at least 24 migrants have died in ICE facilities174 alone during the Trump administration—
numbers that don’t include the range of other facilities holding migrants.175 Causes of death
range from illness to suicide to physical trauma to unknown.176
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Policies such as Operation Streamline and zero-tolerance are largely responsible for
strategies that allow migrants to be stripped of their rights and face extreme violence, abuse, and
death. The Trump administration has acknowledged the cruelty of some of the features of
zero-tolerance, specifically family separation, claiming that the measure was intended to deter
migrants from attempting to cross the border.177 However, as measures such as PTD
demonstrated long ago, strategies of deterrence are largely ineffective - at least in capacity to
deter migrants from crossing borders. The Southwestern U.S. border, and the policy that has
informed what it is today, finds a brutal efficacy through the process of stripping away a
migrant’s political life and inflicting sovereign violence upon them. Prevention Through
Deterrence, in generating copious death at the Southwestern borderlands, created a space of
exception where a migrant could be extracted from their political life, forcibly reducing them to a
homo sacer; the migrant, in only their intent and attempt to cross the border, became a target for
manifold violence permitted and exacerbated by national policy. Strategies of illegalization, such
as the IIRIRA and Operation Streamline allowed the migrant’s sacred life to shadow them,
beyond the borderlands and well into the United States, ensuring that that migrant found
themself in a nearly permanent state of exception - a homo sacer by way of their inevitable
burden of illegality. The zero-tolerance policies introduced in the 2010s are both a consequence
and exacerbation of their predecessors, seeing to a spectacle of securitization that disguises the
legacy of sovereign violence ordained by decades of brutal policy - a legacy which is manifest in
the detention centers, at the borders, and throughout the entirety of the United States.
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Exploitation and Erasure: National Systems of Oppression
The brutality exercised as a result of border policy - in the desert, within the detention
centers - is a mechanism that is both a method of subordination and subordination manifest. As
discourses of danger have made possible these policies of illegalization, deterrence, and
zero-tolerance, the policies themselves both actively subjugate the migrant while simultaneously
acting as evidence of the subjugation already imposed upon the migrant by the performative
aspect of discourses of danger. The sovereign cycle of self-reproduction thus relies on the
ever-pervasive dynamics which divide insider from outsider and discipline any sort of ambiguity,
which aids it making the process itself so difficult to identify - it is boundless and unaffixed to
any sort of geographical or temporal constraints. Thus, those migrants who find themselves
within the interiority of the United States, those who have avoided deportation and prolonged
detention, and even those who might have achieved asylum or residency, are likely to remain the
targets of sovereign violence as long as they remain in the country and perhaps even beyond. The
direct violence sustained by state-sanctioned strategies of illegalization, deterrence, and zero
tolerance has two direct outcomes that track the migrant beyond the borderlands and into the
state that I will discuss in this chapter. The continued violence experienced by migrants living
within U.S. borders represents the permeation of border policy into the interiority of the state,
categorically demonstrating how such policy deliberately provides two essential conditions of
sovereign reproduction: economic exploitation and systemic erasure of the migrant narrative.
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Economic Exploitation
The economic exploitation of the migrant has become a profitable business that begins in
the detention center. Not all holding facilities are state-run; in fact, less than half of detainees are
held in ICE centers or local and county jails. The rest are held in facilities run by private prison
corporations like GEO Group and CoreCivic. These groups derived between 20% and 25% of
their profits from ICE, which has now become their biggest client.178 The policies of
criminalization generated a lucrative business in detaining nonviolent offenders, rapidly filling
up holding facilities and producing billions of dollars in revenue for these corporations effectively, laundering taxpayer money into the private sector.179 De León credits this unethical
pattern with the business relationships private corporations have formed with American
legislators, stating “both parties seem to have agreed that if one builds more detention centers the
other will find ways to fill them.”180 While detention-profiteering may come at the cost of the
American taxpayer, the lack of transparency surrounding this truth coupled with the spectacle of
securitization provided by heightened detention sends a powerful message to American citizens:
that the nation-state is fulfilling its promise of protection against migrants who would, if not
detained, threaten American security and prosperity.
The exploitation of the migrant is not only a manner of specticality to ease American
fears; it is an exploitation necessary to the American way of life. As recently as 2018, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics reported that migrants (both authorized and unauthorized) make up 17.1% of
the American workforce, contributing to vital industries such as farming and food production and
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paying billions of dollars in taxes. However, a landmark study found that 37.1% unauthorized
workers were subject to wage violations, and 84.9% had not been provided the wages they were
legally entitled to for overtime work.181 As I discussed in Chapter 2, the threat of deportation is a
factor that prevents unauthorized workers from reporting these abuses. Migrant guestworkers are
also highly exploited, despite the fact the fact that they have nonimmigrant visas that allow a
“legal” pathway for employment in the United States. Another study found that many of these
workers are forced to pay exorbitant fees to labor recruiters (fees that are usually illegal) in order
to secure employment. Many of these guestworkers find themselves in a form of debt bondage,
with ill-defined conditions of repayment that leave the lender in control of the lendee.182 A
number of cases have revealed that some guestworkers have even been forced into human
trafficking as a result of such practices. College-educated migrant workers in fields of teaching,
nursing, and computer operations have also been subject to firms and recruiters who steal wages
and file lawsuits against workers who threaten to quit.183 The labor abuses of migrant workers
and guestworkers allow industries to keep profits low, a practice that is rampant in some of the
industries upon which American society is most dependent, such as farming and meatpacking
industries.184
Effectively, when policy results in the strengthening of the American economy at the cost
of migrant wellbeing, sovereignty is unequivocally strengthened. For decades, migrant labor has
been essential to the bedrock industries of American life, allowing employers to keep costs down
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at the cost of migrants’ workplace rights. Moreover, the illegalization of migration has been
profitable even beyond the exploitation of migrant labor-power, as the privatization of holding
facilities has allowed certain corporations to capitalize on the industry of detention. The way in
which this kind of exploitation produces American legitimacy goes far beyond whether the
economy is momentarily in an upturn or downturn; the exploitation of migrant labor, and
migrant bodies, is essential to the American way of life. Costs of basic necessities (such as food),
lowered at the expense of the brutal exploitation of unauthorized labor and guestworkers,
supplement the image of the United States as an entity on which belonging members, or citizens,
can rely to provide affordable consumerism through responsible legislation and enforcement. In
actuality, the basis of American consumption is operationalized by the largely unfettered
capitalist interests of the U.S. government, which allow taxpayer dollars to be funneled into the
private sector and the continued, unscrupulous treatment of migrant workers in the workplace.
What is more, the erasure of these conditions from the public eye leads many citizens into
believing that their economy, and the consumerism it facilitates, is restrained by a cornerstone of
ethical workplace laws that have been in effect for a century. It is this erasure of the migrant
narrative that I will now discuss, ultimately demonstrating how it is the final, and perhaps most
effective, measure of sovereign reproduction.

Political Erasure
Migrant workers, and the exploitation they experience, are unquestionably contributors to
the American economy and corporate interests. However, their exploitation achieves something
else - perhaps the most critical element in the production of national sovereignty. The erasure of
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the migrant is both the core of all other forms of sovereign violence, and simultaneously the final
product of each. De León writes, “Immigrants are tolerated when they do the jobs that citizens
won’t, but the American public has little interest in hearing their voices, preserving their history,
or affording them any rights. This ‘exceptionalism’ pervades all aspects of undocumented life
and calls into question our country’s notion of democracy.”185 Despite the emergence of migrant
communities across the country, the migrant is time and time again subject to erasure: they are
not invisible, but purposefully forced into spaces that allow for their neglect, alienation, and
isolation. Funneled into deserts, detention centers, exploitative workplaces, and underserved
communities, the migrant finds their basic human rights violated and themselves
disenfranchised, positioned at the intersection of statelessness and sovereignty such that their
lives are marked by violence in its many forms. The political erasure of the migrant ultimately
breeds the ignorance of American citizens. They believe that the national apparati of violence the border policy, the detention facilities, the bolstering of the economy - as well as their own
negligence of those less politically privileged, signify that the United States is truly effective in
its perceived role: protecting the insider from the outsider. The many ways in which American
policy has subordinated the migrant aid in effectively muting the migrant voice to the citizens
who wield the most political power - those who will thus remain widely negligent to the active
suppression of migrant communities and, as a result, neglect to use their own political agency in
combating that suppression. In the United States, where electoral politics is most accessible for
the fortunate, those who are most underserved have fewer pathways to empowerment. To a
privileged population that espouses viewpoints such as “your vote is your voice,” the actual
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voice of those who are disenfranchised goes largely unheard - and their oppression is thus likely
to remain unobstructed.

Conclusion
Thus, the United States has fulfilled its promise of protection in the eyes of the citizens
and, at last, become re-legitimized in the reproduction of its sovereignty. The instability of
sovereignty is central to nationhood, and as such, so is the process of legitimization that the
nation-state must engage in over and over again. Therefore, the foundation of American
sovereignty rests not only in the ongoing production of xenophobia within its own citizens, but
also in its subsequent promise to provide security for its citizens to protect them from the very
threat the state created. If American legitimacy is grounded in the manufactured discourses of
danger regarding the migrant, and the following promise of security against the migrant, then
such legitimacy is dependent on that threat remaining as it is: impending, but external. Therefore,
it is not simply the promise of security that legitimizes the state; it is also the fulfilment of that
promise that ultimately completes the cycle of reproduction. Under the knowledge that failing to
deliver on such a promise will disrupt this cycle, the American state must then resort to
necropolitical policy - exercising sovereignty by exercising the right to expose migrants to
violence, exploitation, death.186 The political erasure of the migrant is at the core of this process,
muting the migrant voice and allowing the nation-state to take hold of their narrative; a narrative
that the United States has wielded as a spectacle of securitization for its citizens, who remain
ignorant to the brutal soil upon which American sovereignty is founded. The policies, and their
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consequences, that I have analyzed in this chapter demonstrate something specific: the state’s
sovereign right to death and violence, forcing migrants into conditions that will likely result in
their death, or, at the very least, traumatization. Thus, the United States has momentarily fulfilled
the promise to secure its citizens against a threat fabricated by the state in the first place.
The United States should serve as an example of the repercussions of nation-building and
border securitization, but it is certainly not the only instance of necropolitical border policy in the
world. In fact, what I have described of the U.S.-Mexico border is not an anomaly. The
international system is dependent on a series of imagined communities whose existence relies on
borders that demarcate insiders from outsiders, yet the consequences of producing inorganic
boundaries becomes evident in the actual function of nation-state: it is a relentless machine of
self-production, engaging in a never-ending quest for legitimacy. In doing this, the state takes
advantage of perhaps some of the most vulnerable people within the international
system—people fleeing violence, poverty, and persecution. The nation-state does not simply fail
migrants. It exploits them, forcing them into the role of a hollow threat that ends in them paying
with their lives. Ultimately, necropolitics is not an abnormality within the international system,
or even an unfortunate risk of the system—but an inevitable symptom of the logic of nationhood.
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Conclusion
My research began with a simple question. In the wake of limitless brutality that seemed to
define dynamics of migration in the United States, I had to ask why the migrant was so
destabilizing that their presence in the country warranted senseless violence. As I worked to
resolve this conundrum, my findings broadened and narrowed until I was left with a single
conclusion that illuminated the answer to my question as though erupted in flames. The violence
inflicted on those who dare to cross international borders isn’t senseless, but the wanton
operation of a political machinery vested with its own preservation. In short, the migrant is
destabilizing because the nation-state needs them to be. In the grand operation of nationalization,
the transnationality of the migrant is symptomatic, presenting both a great threat to and an
essential condition of its existence. As migrants innately challenge the logic of nationhood, their
lives are reduced to a point at which they are exposed to the forces of sovereign violence,
transformed into a political tool of sovereign reproduction. This process functions as a cycle that
is vicious as it is effective, a testimony to the subordination and exploitation vital to the
nation-state’s continued sovereignty.
The first chapter of this thesis illustrated a paradox of national sovereignty, observing the
condition of inclusion and exclusion that appears critical to the foundation of the nation-state. I
then destabilized this dichotomy, emphasizing how the transnationality of the migrant
complicates the logic of nationhood and borders, and furthermore, threatens to reveal the
constructed nature of nationalization. In doing so, the ingrained condition of transnationality that
accompanies migration threatens the very identity of the nation-state, which operates on the
assumption that it is an organic source of sovereignty. I then detail how the state manages to
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neutralize the threat that the migrant inherently poses: it is not the elimination of the threat that
the state requires, but the dissemination of discourse that portrays migrants as destabilizing
factors to national security and prosperity. This use of discursive power allows the nation-state to
engage in the performative production of its own sovereignty, and the paradox of national
sovereignty materializes: as the transnational nature of migration resists logic of the nation-state,
the nation-state simultaneously relies upon this resistance in order to legitimize its sovereignty.
Effectively, the transnational migrant is a condition of the nation-state’s existence and the key
element in the production of sovereignty.
The second chapter analyzed the function of national borders, first examining the
conventional wisdom that portrays borders as territorially-bound barriers. I argued against this
conception, aiming to demonstrate that the border is aphysical rather than geographic, providing
not a physical boundary between insiders and outsiders but a condition of existence imposed
upon those at the intersection of sovereignty and statelessness. The national border, I asserted, is
not affixed to the seam of two nation-states, but permeates the entirety of the nation-state as a
condition of exception foisted upon those who find themselves at a particular political
localization. In the next section, I provided an analysis of Agamben’s notion of sacred life as it
pertains to national borders. I examined how the aphysical localization of national borders allows
them to act as a rendering process, rather than a barrier, that strips migrants of their political life
and exposes them to sovereign violence. I argued that this process resists the perception of
citizenship as a binary and instead exposes it to be a spectrum which can be divided into three
ambiguous and flexible classifications of anti-citizen, quasi-citizen, and citizen - each being
defined not by their relation to inclusion, but to death. Finally, I considered how the
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border-rendering process promotes the deliberate erasure and exploitation of the migrant. I
conclude that the nation-state weaponizes national borders as means of engaging in a process of
sovereign reproduction. This process allows the reduction of the migrant to bare life with the
purpose of exposing them to sovereign violence. As a result of this imposition, the nation-state
subjugates the migrant through means of labor exploitation, detention, and physical harm.
The final chapter provided an empirical account of my findings, detailing the operation of
the Southwestern United States border with Mexico. I observed the discourses of danger that
surround the presence of Mexican and Central American migrants in the United States,
attempting to destabilize the conventions that convey migrants as threats to economic and
personal security. I then attempted to exhibit the true accomplishment of these discourses of
danger, analyzing policies of illegalization, deterrence, and zero-tolerance. Finally, I concluded
how, through the exploitation and erasure of the migrant within the United States, the
nation-state fulfills a cycle of self-reproduction and, in doing so, strengthens its own sovereignty.
It is upon the theft of the migrant narrative in which the state may ultimately begin its cycle of
sovereign reproduction, achieved only through the employment of brutal strategy. My definitive
intention was to illustrate how national sovereignty requires the subordination and violation of
migrants, laying the bloody groundwork upon which every nation-state is constructed.
The theoretical framework and empirical study I have provided in this thesis largely
examines the nation-state and its operation, illustrating the way in which migration is
weaponized in order to achieve the never-ending production of sovereignty. However, as I
conclude this paper, I do not wish the reader to conceive of migrants themselves as a non-agentic
tool of national configuration. The perception of otherized individuals as powerless victims is no

101
more productive than considering them to be hazardous threats, and only serves to embolden
conventions of superiority that have allowed hegemonic nation-states to exploit the condition of
migration in the first place. Despite the grim undertone of my analysis, I wish to impart upon the
reader that migrant communities around the world have exercised their agency not in spite of, but
against the violence imposed upon them by nationalization - for as the nation-state constructs its
own legitimacy against the identity of the “other,” migrant communities have constructed
empowerment against these conditions of oppression.
As a final note, I turn to a case in Fort Meyers, Florida, where nearly 100,000 migrants
turned out in waves to protest the introduction of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and
Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437). The bill at hand proposed severe
securitization of the border as well as interior enforcement, seeking to both heighten the
criminalization of unauthorized border crossing as well as discourage citizens from aiding
unauthorized migrants in their journey. Chris Zepeda Millán demonstrates how, despite existing
research claiming that Latin American migrants in the United States were the least likely to
participate in political activism, the threat of H.R. 4337 sparked a far-reaching, community-based
movement against harmful policy. The array of political actors engaged in this movement was
incredibly diverse, with the coalition of the march composed of three organizations: the Concilio
Mexicano de la Florida (the Concilio), a group representing over 300 mostly Mexican small
businesses; the Coalición de Ligas Hispanas del estado de la Florida, a regional coalition of
Latino immigrant soccer leagues with over 10,000 players; and a collective of a handful of
independent immigrant activists who called themselves Inmigrantes Latinos Unidos de la Florida
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(ILUF).187 The solidarity exhibited among this array of actors was accomplished by a subordinate
group that managed to construct its own spaces of empowerment that remained free from
intervention from above, achieved only by the community roots and the political autonomy of
the activists involved - undeniably developing “oppositional consciousness and actions” against
the subordination of the state. Zepeda Millán illustrates the agency employed by these
communities that allowed the mobilization of such a movement, noting organizers who drove
hours from their homes to speak to crowds regarding the impact of H.R. 4437; radio DJs who
used their publicity to advertise the march; domestic workers who distributed flyers; laborers
who organized through their network of colleagues; and owners of food trucks who distributed
free meals and water at coalition meetings.188 It was individual action as well as the work of the
coalitions that contributed to the success of the demonstration. One participant was quoted to say
that this action “gave people the confidence to participate … because they knew we were all
going to be there … and that immigration, the police, or whoever [wouldn’t be able to] take
everyone away.”
The activism surrounding H.R. 4437 may not be a well-known instance in the scope of
migration discourse, yet I believe it conveys spectacular resistance in the face of subordination.
The protest of H.R. 4337 demonstrates the awe-inspiring capacity of marginalized groups, who
relied on the resources of only their own communities to develop spaces of empowerment and
demonstrate their discontent. The case in Fort Meyers exhibits both the heterogeneity of a largely
homogenized group wielding their individuality as soccer players, business owners, domestic
and manual workers, and organizers to achieve a collective identity that made their political
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demonstration possible. What this single case captures is the spirit of communities who have
been the target of sovereign violence; the intrinsic flaw in the national process of sovereign
reproduction. The dynamic, cyclical process of sovereign legitimation relies on the constant
reconstruction of an identity against an external body; a body which in turn must be brutalized
and subordinated in order to fortify the nation-state. However, the nation-state has never, and
will never, achieve full control over the migrant narrative. The weapon of sovereign violence
will never achieve stasis of national sovereignty, for as it is employed over and over again, it
provides something against which the subordinated may forge their own collective identity. As I
have stated, the migrant is a destabilizing figure only in that the nation-state requires it to be.
This is the primordial flaw of the nation-state: as the nation-state requires instability, it depends
on brutality to contain it - and it is this brutality which produces the formation of identity among
the marginalized. Ultimately, the necropolitical foundation upon which the nation-state stands is
its fundamental weakness, as the targets of sovereign violence will never remain fully suppressed
but, in time, become empowered through their own subordination.
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